
Paul Preston
THE
POLITICS
OF
REVENGE
Fascism and the military in 20th century Spain

Preface

The historiography of modern Spain is overwhelmingly, and perhaps inevitably, obsessed with the examination of the causes, course and consequences of the Civil War. The fratricide of the 1930s has given rise to a bibliography which is astonishingly large, disproportionately so when compared with that on the Second World War. Leaving aside the enormous body of propaganda, polemic and personal memoirs, one curious feature of the abundance of writing on twentieth-century Spain is the sheer weight of scholarship about the left. At one level, that is understandable. The revolutionary exploits of Spanish anarchists make passionately interesting reading. The bitter rivalries between Spanish socialists and anarchists are hardly less engrossing. The internecine conflicts between anarchists, socialists and communists lie at the heart of the reasons for the defeat of the Spanish Republic, and with it, the collapse of the great collectivist experiments of the Civil War.

On the other hand, the fascination of the left rather obscures the fact that the Spanish Republic was a short-lived interval, almost an aberration, in a modern history dominated by the right. Accordingly, the immediate justification for this book is the relative lack of serious consideration of the Spanish right in English, or indeed in any other language. Most of those who have written about, or have been sympathetic to, the left have little or nothing to say about the right. A majority of those who have written about the right have tended to be propagandists of its cause, taking for granted that ultimately the justification for the Civil War could be found in left-wing disorder. There are, of course, outstanding and honourable exceptions.[1] Nevertheless, by comparison

1 Although I do not always agree with their conclusions, the prolific works on various aspects of Francoism, the army and the right in general by Javier Tusell in Spain and Stanley G. Payne in the United States are indispensable. My own debts to them will be apparent from the footnotes of the present book. The writing of Martin Blinkhorn on Carlism is seminal and, in demonstrating how the ideological well-springs of the Spanish right are to be found in traditionalism, has resonances far beyond its immediate subject. The trail-blazing contributions of Herbert R. Southworth to the study of Falangism in particular and of the wider aspects of Francoist manipulations of its own historical record remain crucial. A short guide to further reading also highlights some important monographic contributions by young Spanish scholars.

with the left, the right has not been the object of an abundant historiography.

During several years living in Spain it was impossible not to be led by my own research into the political conflicts of the Second Republic, and by my everyday observations, to see a Spanish right which seemed harsh, rigid and obstinate, in comparison with the relatively flexible conservatism that then still apparently prevailed in England. I was also much struck by the extent to which the right, in the starkest possible contrast with the left, and despite the considerable ideological, strategic and tactical discrepancies between its component groups, tended to act with unity of purpose. During the Second Republic, the various rightist groups acted as 'regiments in the same army'. The scale of their co-operation throughout the Republic was matched and intensified during the Civil War, something which posed remarkable comparisons with the comportment of the left. The particular development of Spanish history in the twentieth century can be traced in large measure to the right's obstinacy, inflexibility and fear of democracy, just as the country's present progress can in some measure be attributed to the emergence of a modern, moderate and civilized right capable of working within a democratic system.

The remarkable solidarity of the right during the 1930s was crisis-induced and, once the Civil War was won, discrepancies could re-emerge. Those discrepancies formed the basis of the belief that, under Franco, there was a kind of limited pluralism. When the regime once again underwent a major crisis in the mid-1970s, a different kind of unity was re-established by those elements of the Francoist coalition, the army and the Falange, which had evolved least during the years of dictatorship. In the interim between the rightist unity of the Civil War and the rather narrower unity of the 1970s' retreat into the bunker, the right evolved dramatically in different directions under Franco. For many Catholics and monarchists the dictatorship's harsher face became increasingly unacceptable. There were Falangists too who considered the stultifyingly bureaucratic atmosphere of the regime to be a betrayal of their original ideals. The authoritarian Catholic leader José María Gil Robles, the one-time monarchist backer of the Falange, José María de Areilza, the Christian Democrat ex-minister of Franco, Joaquín Ruiz Giménez and the Falangist poet Dionisio Ridruejo were the most striking cases of the evolution of right-wingers who came to oppose the dictatorship. There were to be many others, Francoist functionaries, of whom Adolfo Suárez is merely the most celebrated, who evolved to a point where they were to work for the transition from dictatorship to democracy. There were, of course, those who developed in other, more retrogressive, ways.

The chapters of this book attempt to provide some sense of the unity and the development of the hard-line right. What they do not do is discuss the evolution of a democratic, constitutional right, whose components I

have examined at length in my book *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (Methuen, London, 1986). Nor, except marginally, are they concerned with the political role of the Catholic Church. This book centres rather on various closely linked aspects of the relationship between fascism and the military in the fifty years from the birth of the Second Republic in 1931 to the despairing military coup of 1981. It examines the roles of fascism and the military as instruments of right-wing dominance in twentieth-century Spain. It does so with particular regard to General Franco and his ongoing preoccupation with his own survival. The total identification between the Caudillo and his regime ensured that neither he nor most of his followers saw any contradiction between his personal interests and those of the servants and backers of the dictatorship. Nevertheless, by the 1970s, some of its most powerful supporters saw the regime as an anachronism and were therefore prepared to open negotiations with the forces of the moderate left. Because Franco had used the instruments of his dictatorship entirely in the interests of a narrowly partisan view of his own and the regime's interests, they found themselves divorced from the sectors of society for whom they had fought between 1936 and 1939. The greatest victim in this regard was, paradoxically, the army. Its interests should have transcended the immediate protection of a transitory dictatorship. That is one of the recurring themes of this volume.

The book opens with a chapter on the nature of fascism in Spain. Attempts to define Spanish fascism have been bedevilled by the fact that the one undisputably fascist party in the 1930s, the Falange, was numerically weak and overshadowed by the army. Chapter 1 examines the Spanish variant of fascism both in its long-term historical context and as merely one of the various units among the rightist forces. In this sense, its argument is that to confine the search for fascism in Spain to the pre-Civil War Falange Española is a meaningless exercise. It suggests rather that a more fruitful object of examination is the broad counter-revolutionary alliance of the parties which supported the Francoist cause, forcibly formalized as Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista in April 1937. Although merely a part of a wider whole, FET y de las JONS was to give a fascist veneer to the wider Francoist coalition. Chapter 2 explores the ways in which the collective memory of the Spanish Civil War was manipulated by the dictatorship, through the Falangist propaganda machine and its Youth Front, in schools and in military academies, through cultural artefacts and censorship. It examines the crude construction of an ideological hegemony which aimed to keep together the Francoist coalition by dividing the population into victors and vanquished.

Three pairs of matching chapters follow. The first concerns two related aspects of General Franco's survival in the period when he was most vulnerable both to internal political machinations and to overthrow by an external power. Chapter 3 examines the temptation of General Franco

by the Axis in the Second World War. It considers the way in which he survived both his own and the Falange's enthusiasm for the new Hitlerian world order. It suggests that the exquisitely careful diplomacy of *hábil prudencia* seen by Franco's admirers as the reason for Spain's wartime neutrality played less of a part than did good fortune and the errors of judgement of Hitler and Ribbentrop. That examination of pro-Axis inclinations within the Franco camp is balanced by Chapter 4, which traces the Caudillo's skilful deflection of the tentative efforts of his generals to restrain his dictatorial inclinations. The second pair of chapters is made up of broad surveys of the evolving roles of both the military and the Falange under the Franco regime. In each case, these two instruments of the dictatorship were radically changed, even distorted, by the way in which they allowed themselves to be exploited by the dictator himself. The final pair of matched chapters considers the efforts of both fascists and soldiers to resurrect the past in the aftermath of Franco's death. They examine the subversive activities of the civilian and military 'bunkers' during the break-up of the dictatorship and the transition to democracy.

In the course of preparing this volume, I derived incalculable benefit from the encouragement and criticisms of Enrique Moradiellos, Florentino Portero and Ismael Saz, with all three of whom I discussed at length many of the specific ideas elaborated here. I would like to thank Chris Ealham for preparing the index. Other debts are more diffuse and range back over time. For twenty years, I have learned an enormous amount about the workings of Spanish politics from Elías Díaz. For almost as many years, Angel Viñas has been a limitless fount of information and insight into the structures of Francoism. Sheelagh Ellwood continues to teach me much about the Falange, its inner workings and the personalities of its leaders. My earliest researches into the Spanish right benefited from the help and hospitality of Herbert R. Southworth. For many years, he has made available to me with boundless generosity the resources of his library and his incomparable knowledge of the Falange and Francoism. The book is dedicated to Raymond Carr and James Joll, with gratitude for their unstinting support in all my academic enterprises.

Chronology

1892	4 December	Birth of Francisco Franco Bahamonde in El Ferrol.
1898		Defeat of Spain by USA. Loss of Cuba, Puerto Rico and Philippines.
1905	25 November	*Cu-Cut* incident. Army officers attack offices of satirical weekly in reprisal for the publication of an anti-military joke.
1906	20 March	Army secures military jurisdiction over offences against the *patria* and the armed forces.
1917		Military Defence Juntas, formed to protest about low pay and to protect the system of promotion by strict seniority, become involved with industrialists and trade unionists in a national reform movement, yet violently repress a socialist general strike.
1923	13 September	Military coup led by General Primo de Rivera.
1930	30 January	Primo de Rivera replaced by General Dámaso Berenguer.
1931	14 March	Foundation of fascist newspaper *La Conquista del Estado* by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos.
1931	14 April	Departure of Alfonso XIII and the foundation of the Second Republic.
1931	26 April	Foundation of Catholic authoritarian party, Acción Popular.
1931	10 October	Foundation of fascist party, Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista by Onesimo Redondo and Ramiro Ledesma Ramos.
1931	15 December	Foundation of Alfonsine monarchist society and journal Acción Española.
1933	28 February	Acción Popular unites with other legalist rightist groups to form the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas.
	1 March	Acción Española creates political front organization, Renovación Española.
	29 October	José Antonio Primo de Rivera launches Falange Española.
	19 November	José Antonio Primo de Rivera elected parliamentary deputy for Cádiz.

1934	11 February	Falange Española merges with the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista to become FE de las JONS.
	6 October	General strike, left-wing uprising in Asturias and brief declaration of Catalan independence, both crushed by army.
1936	16 February	Popular Front wins elections.
	14 March	FE de las JONS outlawed and its leadership, including José Antonio Primo de Rivera, arrested.
	18 July	Military uprising; Civil War starts.
	20 November	Execution in Alicante of José Antonio Primo de Rivera.
1937	19 April	Franco unites Falange, Carlists, CEDA and Renovación Española into Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las JONS and suppresses the radical Falangists under Hedilla.
1939	1 April	End of Civil War.
1940	13 June	Spain moves from neutrality to non-belligerency.
	14 June	Spain occupies Tangiers.
	17 September	Ramón Serrano Suñer visits Hitler and Ribbentrop.
	19 October	Himmler visits Madrid and inaugurates collaboration of Gestapo in reorganization of Spanish police.
	23 October	Franco meets Hitler at Hendaye.
1941	12 February	Franco meets Mussolini at Bordighera.
	14 February	Franco meets Pétain at Montpellier.
	27 June	Spain moves from non-belligerency to 'moral belligerency' in the Axis orbit.
	25 November	Serrano Suñer visits Berlin and renews Anti-Comintern Pact.
1942	3 September	Serrano Suñer dismissed as Foreign Minister.
1943	3 October	Spain abandons non-belligerency and readopts neutrality.
1944	28 January	Spanish failure to stop wolfram deliveries to Germany leads to American oil embargo.
1945	11 September	Fascist salute no longer obligatory greeting in Spanish public life.
	18 September	Spanish withdrawal from Tangiers.
1946	13 December	United Nations recommends withdrawal of ambassadors from Madrid.
1947	1 April	Ley de Succesión defines Spain a kingdom.
1950	4 November	UNO approves possible Spanish membership of international organizations.
1953	27 August	Concordat with Vatican.
	26 September	Pact of Madrid with USA provides for American bases in Spain in return for military equipment.
1955	8 December	Spain accepted into UNO.
1956	February	Student troubles mark major reverse for Falange.
1957	25 February	Opus Dei technocrats enter Franco's cabinet.
1962	March-May	Strike wave in Asturias, Basque country and Catalonia.
1963	20 April	Execution of Communist Julián Grimau.

	28 December	Introduction of first Development Plan.
1970	3–28 December	Burgos trials of Basque revolutionary separatists of ETA.
1971	March-April	Emergence of ultra-rightist terror squads.
1973	8 June	Admiral Carrero Blanco made head of government.
	20 December	Carrero Blanco assassinated by ETA.
1974	April	Emergence of liberal military pressure group Unión Militar Democrática.
1975	20 November	Death of Franco.
1976	March	Trials of army officers implicated in Unión Militar Democrática.
1976	22 September	Resignation of Minister of Defence in protest at legalization of trade union.
1977	15 June	First democratic elections since 1936.
1978	17 November	*Operación Galaxia*, failed military coup involving Colonel Antonio Tejero.
1981	23 February	Colonel Tejero seizes parliament and the entire political élite as the first stage of an elaborate, and ultimately abortive, military coup.

1

Resisting modernity: fascism and the military in twentieth-century Spain

In the summer of 1936 important sections of the officer corps of the Spanish army rose against the Second Republic. The officers involved were convinced that they were acting to save their country from the breakdown of law and order, the disintegration of national unity and waves of proletarian godlessness provoked by foreign agents. They believed themselves to be acting disinterestedly, inspired only by the highest patriotic values.[1] In fact, the military uprising, the consequent protracted war effort between 1936 and 1939 and the dictatorship which institutionalized the eventual victory of the rebels all shared a socially and politically partisan function. The function, if not the explicit intention, of the military rebels of 1936 and the military rulers of Spain after 1939 was, in addition to rooting out regionalism and reasserting the hegemony of institutionalized Catholicism, the protection of the interests of the agrarian-financial-industrial élites. In particular, that meant shielding the reactionary landed oligarchy from the challenge to Spain's antiquated economic structures embodied in the reforms of the Second Republic.

In 1936, for a number of complex reasons, the military uprising could count on a substantial amount of popular support that was, in the crudest terms, broadly equivalent to the combined electoral strengths of the major right-wing parties of the Second Republic.[2] That civilian support was consolidated in the course of the Spanish Civil War because of religious convictions reinforced by the Catholic Church's commitment

1 Gabriel Cardona, *El poder militar en la España contemporánea hasta la guerra civil* (Madrid, 1983), pp. 197–247.

2 Although there is a massive bibliography of regional electoral studies, there exists no satisfactory study of the electoral geography of the 1930s Spain as a whole. Jean Bécarud, *La segunda República española 1931–1936: ensayo de interpretación* (Madrid, 1967) remains the best overview. See pp. 97–104, 125–41, 155–83. Javier Tusell, *Las elecciones del Frente Popular*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1971) is the best study of the last elections before the military uprising, see Vol. II, pp. 22–58. For the largest mass party of the right, the CEDA, whose rank and file made up a large part of Franco's armies, there is the comprehensive study by José R. Montero, *La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1977). See Vol. II, pp. 271–336.

to Franco, fear fuelled by political terror, the geographical loyalty of those whose survival instincts dictated that they adhere to the Nationalist cause, the wartime intensification of passions and hatreds provoked by atrocities in both zones, and the victorious dictatorship's capacity to disburse patronage and preferment. This is not to say that the Franco dictatorship was as popular as its propagandists claimed but simply to recognize that it had an autonomous base of mass support and was not merely the instrument of an isolated clique of soldiers and plutocrats.[3] The mechanism whereby the military mobilized and channelled that civilian backing was the sprawling umbrella organization of the right, the *Movimiento* or, more formally, the Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, artificially created by the forced unification of the pro-Franco political parties in April 1937.[4]

The *Unificación* merely formalized the fact that the Franco regime was built upon a coalition of interlocking and overlapping forces, Falangists, Carlists, authoritarian Catholics and aristocratic monarchists. The Nationalist coalition was legitimized by the Catholic Church and dominated by its own praetorian guard. There would always be a certain rivalry for power between the component groups although the jostling was usually restrained, exploding into violence but rarely and then on the smallest scale. Inter-regime hostilities were kept within bounds by an awareness of the need to cling together against the recently defeated left. It is often said that General Franco's supreme skill was the ability to manage in his own interests the competition between his supporters. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to imply that they were not willing collaborators in his political juggling act. After all, the Caudillo's own position was never seriously threatened in thirty-eight years of dictatorial power.

The fact that Franco was so infrequently challenged reflected both the power of the army within the Spanish right and the care which he devoted to his own relationship with the military. Although it was ultimately to be diminished by its part in the dictatorship, the army maintained a privileged position, to an extent *au dessous de la mêlée*. Its only serious challengers for dominance of the Francoist establishment were to be found in the Falange and then only in the early years of the regime. It is not entirely surprising that the two most powerful instruments of Francoism, the civilian and the military, united under pressure during

3 The alleged isolation of the Franco clique was a constant feature of Communist Party analyses of its own strategic necessities. See, for example, Partido Comunista de España, *¡Por la Unión Nacional de todos los españoles contra Franco, los invasores germano-italianos y los traidores!* (México D. F., 1941); Fernando Claudín, *Las divergencias en el Partido* (n.p., but Paris, 1964) pp. 9–17.

4 Maximiano García Venero, *Falange en la guerra de España: la unificación y Hedilla* (Paris, 1967); Herbert R. Southworth, *Antifalange: estudio crítico de Falange en la guerra de España* (Paris, 1967).

the Civil War and then again in the last days of the dictatorship, should be rivals in the interim. The tensions between them were to be most acute during the Second World War when the Falange perhaps appeared stronger than it really was, its ranks flooded by recent recruits from other parties and its influence inflated by the military successes of Hitler and by the machinations of the German embassy.[5] After 1945 its strength was slowly to wane. Throughout the war, however, the Falange was to be a raucous advocate of Spanish entry into the Second World War on the Axis side. Although there was no shortage of fascist army officers, many of the most senior generals, invariably Catholic and often monarchists, adopted a patrician tone and expressed contempt for Falangists as upstart riff-raff. Moreover, in contrast to the ideological zealots of the Falange, the high command was cautious, after the devastation of the Civil War, about making any commitment to the Axis, despite an admiration for German military prowess.

By 1943 the balance in the internal jostling for power was tipping against the Falange. While the army's position remained as strong as ever, after the fall of Mussolini, the voice of the Falange was muted. In the aftermath of the Second World War the political pre-eminence of the Falange within the dictatorship was diminished by Franco. Anxious to clear himself of the stigma of his Axis and fascist connections, he began to look for senior political servants among the ranks of authoritarian Catholics.[6] Nevertheless, the Falange still maintained an important presence in Franco's cabinets. Outside of government it stood astride a substantial, and profitable, power base, controlling a huge national and provincial press chain and the state trade union system, as well as commanding insidious influence through its mass organizations, the Youth Front and the Feminine Section.[7] Over the subsequent decades that influence was to decline inexorably, its fascist rhetoric rendered anachronistic by social and economic changes that were impelling Spain towards ultimate integration in a democratic Europe. Ironically, the military, despite its essentially stronger position was also to lose political relevance. That was to be

5 Klaus-Jörg Ruhl, *Franco, Falange y Tercer Reich: España durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Madrid, 1986), pp. 45–74, 167–211. For a highly colourful account, see Aline, Countess of Romanones, *The Spy Wore Red: My Adventures as an Undercover Agent in World War II* (London, 1987), pp. 110–14.

6 Javier Tusell, *Franco y los Católicos: la política interior española entre 1945 y 1957* (Madrid, 1984), pp. 52–79.

7 On the press, see Javier Terrón Montero, *La prensa de España durante el régimen de Franco* (Madrid, 1981) and Justino Sinova, *La censura durante el franquismo* (Madrid, 1989); on the corporative syndicates, see Miguel A. Aparicio, *El sindicalismo vertical y la formación del Estado franquista* (Barcelona, 1980); on the Youth Front, see Juan Sáez Marín, *El Frente de Juventudes: política de juventud en la España de la postguerra (1937–1960)* (Madrid, 1988); on the Sección Femenina, see María Teresa Gallego Méndez, *Mujer, Falange y franquismo* (Madrid, 1983).

the price paid for acquiescing in professional decay under Franco in return for political privilege, for putting the defence of the dictatorship before the military defence of the nation.[8] By the late 1950s Spain's economic development was already such that a military dictatorship was demonstrably an obstacle to further growth. The military and the Falange were thus finally thrown together again, a *rapprochement* between them favoured by the fact that the upper ranks of the army were dominated from the 1960s onwards by Falangist sympathizers who had become provisional second-lieutenants, or *alféreces provisionales*, during the Civil War. No longer confident of the popular support which they had seemed to enjoy at the end of the Civil War, isolated generals and Falangists joined in a series of desperate ventures to destroy the democratic regime established after the death of Franco.[9]

The differences between the army officers of 1931–6 and those of 1973–81 are revealing of the enormous changes which had taken place on the Spanish right in the course of the Franco dictatorship. In the 1930s officers could convince themselves that they were the defenders of essential national values, the territorial integrity of Spain, the Catholic Church and landed property against Moscow-inspired threats. Moreover, in assuming the role of defenders of the 'true Spain', they could do so in the conviction of representing far from negligible sectors of society. When the uprising took place on 18 July 1936 the highly politicized, modern press networks of the right had been unreservedly behind them for months, if not years. That more or less guaranteed the mass support discernible in the electoral geography of the right under the Second Republic. The bulk of the church hierarchy gave them their blessing. Bankers and industrialists looked to them as saviours. Accordingly, the pride of senior army officers in the 1940s was not born solely of their military victory, but also of the unshakeable confidence that they were playing a hegemonic role in Spanish society with the endorsement of the church, the economic élites and large numbers of ordinary Spanish Catholics.

In contrast, many of the army officers of the final days of the Franco regime were entirely divorced from society. The church had withdrawn its support from the Franco regime in the late 1960s and put its weight behind the growing popular clamour for democracy. The most dynamic sectors of banking and industry were also betting on democratic change. After the death of Franco opinion polls and subsequent elections showed

8 On the price paid by the army for its links with the dictatorship, see Chapter 6, 'Destiny and dictatorship'.

9 See Chapter 7 'Into the bunker' and Chapter 8, 'Francoism's last stand'. For the wider political context of the transition to democracy, see Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London, 1986).

that the hard-line Francoist right would never enjoy more than 3 per cent of popular support, and almost all of that concentrated in the two Castiles.[10] Although the rhetoric of the military plotters of the late 1970s barely differed from that heard in the officers' messes of the 1940s, still shot through with references to the Civil War and hatred of the left, it was uttered now not with pride but with resentment. The conspirators of 1936 could reasonably believe that they were saving Spain, not for all Spaniards, but certainly for those who mattered. In contrast, the rancorous *golpistas* of 1981, for all their arrogant swagger, were embittered that even the Spaniards who mattered were no longer interested in the values of the Civil War.

Transformations in the social structure and in the levels of economic development within Spain itself, together with political changes in the world outside, account for the dramatic evolution of the roles of both fascism and the military within the Francoist repertoire. In the murky political twilight of Franco's senile decay, those changes had rendered obsolete the dictatorship, its Falangist apparatus and its military defences. Nevertheless, both Falangists and army officers bestirred themselves to defend their regime. Thereafter, the civilian and military extreme right, known collectively as the 'bunker', worked desperately to overturn the process of democratization. That some sectors of the army and the apparatus of the *Movimiento* should refuse to fade away along with their Caudillo or seek some *rapprochement* with the constitutional monarchy was the natural consequence of the role allotted to each by the dictatorship.

The relationship between fascism and the military in Spain was one which changed significantly in the course of the dictatorship, moving from the uneasy alliance of the Civil War years to something more symbiotic in the 1970s. In fact, the political pre-eminence of the army in taking the lead in the assault on the Second Republic and throughout the Franco dictatorship has been used to absolve Francoism of accusations that it was fascist. However, the co-operation of the Spanish army and the Falange during the Civil War and in the 1970s was far from being that of master and servant. It was different from that between the Wehrmacht and the Nazi Party or that between the Italian army and the Fascist Party, in that the Spanish army held the upper hand. Yet, in all three cases, the fascist party and the army were important elements of a wider counter-revolutionary alliance. In each country, the balance of forces within that alliance was different, for reasons to do with the particular traditions of the armed forces, their recent history and the

10 *El País*, 3 March 1979, 21 November 1982; Fundación Foessa, *Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España 1975–1981*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1981), Vol. I, pp. 503–6; Diario 16, *Historia de la transición*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1984), Vol. II, pp. 466, 580.

special national circumstances of the emergence of counter- revolutionary groups.

The Italian army was more subservient to the dictator than the Spanish. Nevertheless, the ambition of fascist leaders such as De Vecchi, Farinacci and Balbo to '*fascistizzare*' the army was frustrated. The activities of the fascist militia were also restrained.[11] The process whereby Hitler passed from deference towards the German officer corps to a contemptuous domination thereof was a complex one, taking over five years to accomplish. However, although the circumstances were rather different and the consequences slower to materialize, the introduction of Nazi elements as part of the major expansion of the Wehrmacht had its Spanish parallel in the influx of *alféreces provisionales* during the Civil War.[12] Where there is to be found a substantial difference is in the personality and political concerns of the leader of the counter-revolutionary alliance. Accordingly, the exercise of personal control over the military machine by both Mussolini and Hitler ensured that the Italian and German armies would not be restraining elements in the elaboration of foreign policy. Franco was, after all, a general himself and responsive to the efforts of the high command to persuade him to resist the Axis temptation.[13] In the Spanish, German and Italian cases, transactions and servitudes, mutual contempt and hidden resentments were present in the co-operation of patrician backers, army officers and fascist activists along with genuine enthusiasms.

In the field of fascist–military relations, exact scientific definitions are a chimera. One of the attractions of limiting the study of fascism in Spain to the Falange is that it neatly side-steps a number of thorny interpretative and ideological problems. If Spanish fascism can be reduced to the squalid hybrid founded by José Antonio Primo de Rivera then other groups of the authoritarian right, like the CEDA or Renovación Española, can simply be excluded from a discussion of the subject. More important, Franco's post-Civil War emasculation of the Falange lets his regime off the hook of being deemed fascist. It may well be that, in so far as precise definitions are possible, the Franco regime was not strictly fascist. The implication that it was therefore something less morally distasteful, merely 'conservative' or authoritarian perhaps, is misplaced. It may be legitimate to dismiss the regime's fascist veneer and its intimate and dependent relations with

11 Giorgio Rochat and Giulio Massobrio, *Breve storia dell' Esercito italiano dal 1861 al 1943* (Turin, 1978), pp. 201–16.

12 Klaus-Jürgen Müller, *The Army, Politics and Society in Germany 1933–45* (Manchester, 1987), pp. 29–41; Sir John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power: The German Army in Politics 1918–1945* (London, 1953), pp. 289–94; Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640–1945* 2nd edn, (New York, 1964), pp. 469–503.

13 See Chapter 3, 'Franco and the Axis temptation' and Chapter 4, 'Franco and his generals'.

Italian fascism and German Nazism as cynical masks or circumstantial alliances. However, its record in terms of the imprisonment, torture and execution of its working-class and liberal enemies invites seriously unfavourable comparison with Italian fascism. Indeed, as Himmler was to observe in 1940, the Franco regime was more brutal in its treatment of the Spanish working class than was the Third Reich in its dealings with German workers.[14]

If style and ideology, rather than social and economic function, are the main criteria for defining fascism then the exclusive choice of Falange Española as the Spanish candidate is inevitable. Its cult of violence contributed to the destabilization of the Second Republic. Its blue-shirted militias, with their Roman salutes and their ritual chants, gave every indication of aping Nazi and Fascist models. However, this chapter argues that the meaningful examination of fascism in Spain is best freed from the constraints implicit in isolated consideration of Falange Española. Instead, it argues from two premises which impel the discussion towards wider chronological and political parameters. The first is that the nature of fascism in Spain cannot be understood without consideration of the country's backward agrarian capitalism and the crisis that it was undergoing in the 1930s. The second is that that crisis stimulated the elaboration of extraordinary political measures in the form of the counter-revolutionary coalition which fought the Spanish Civil War. The Nationalist alliance was analogous to the counter-revolutionary groupings which emerged in Italy and Germany in response to their particular national crises. It differed in its balance of component forces, but it nevertheless played a comparable structural role. Accordingly, it is argued that the search for a Spanish fascism should consider the unified Francoist coalition as a whole. Seen in such a context, Falange Española simply becomes one, albeit the most servile, as the army was another, of the groups which co-operated to defend Spain's beleaguered oligarchy.

The political instability which impelled army officers to plot and then to launch a *coup d'état* in 1936 was real enough. It was partly the product of working-class desperation and internecine conflicts between sectors of the labour movement in the face of economic depression and intransigent oligarchical resistance to change.[15] More immediately,

14 Ramón Garriga, *La España de Franco: les relaciones con Hitler* (Puebla, Mexico, 1970), pp. 207–9.

15 For excellent local studies of militancy born of desperation and inter-union conflict, see, among many others, Santos Juliá Díaz, *Madrid, 1931–1934: de la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases* (Madrid, 1984), pp. 147–208; José Manuel Macarro Vera, *La utopia revolucionaria: Sevilla en la segunda República* (Seville, 1985), pp. 156–71, 214–42, 279–305, 446–81; David Ruiz, *Insurrección defensiva y revolución obrera* (Barcelona, 1988), pp. 84–97; Graham Kelsey, 'Anarchosyndicalism, libertarian communism and the state: the CNT in Zaragoza and Aragón, 1930–1937', unpublished PhD thesis (University of Lancaster, 1984).

it was the fruit of a deliberate destabilization programme sponsored by the landowners and industrialists most threatened by reform. Before the army assumed the defence of their interests, they had been guarded by a number of rightist political organizations. For the largest of them, the clerical authoritarian Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas or CEDA, military intervention signalled the failure of its Trojan-horse tactic of blocking reform within the limits of Republic legality. Nevertheless, in a number of ways, the majority of CEDA members threw in their lot with the uprising. For the others, the troglodytic Carlists of the Comunión Tradicionalista, the radical monarchists of Renovación Española and the blue-shirted fascists of Falange Española, the rising was the fruition of their 'catastrophist' commitment to the violent overthrow of the Republic.[16]

With a few notable exceptions, the rank and file and the leaders of both legalist and 'catastrophist' organizations rallied readily behind the army, providing the cannon fodder of the rebel war effort and the political service class of the rebel zone. This was formalized in April 1937 by the so-called Unificación, when prewar rightist groups were subsumed into Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista. The fact that this strange amalgam took its title and its tone from the Falange met with little resistance from the other groups which, hitherto, had regarded the Falange as a rowdy street-fighting rabble to be patronized and used. The reasons for such humility were various. A recognition of the urgent political and economic issues at stake in the war inhibited manifestations of ruffled pride which might have disrupted the unity necessary for victory. Moreover, the aid given to the rebels by Hitler and Mussolini was helping to build an enthusiastic belief that the future world order would be a fascist one. In any case, the adoption of a Falangist nomenclature and liturgy did no violence to rightist consciences since, even before the war, a mimetic sympathy for fascism was a common feature of all Spanish right-wing organizations.[17]

It is not surprising, given the fulsome praise heaped on the German and Italian regimes and the proliferation of militarized youth sections, that the left in Spain indiscriminately regarded the parties of the right as fascist. It

16 Paul Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War* (henceforth *CSCW*) (London, 1978) pp. 188, 200; Javier Tusell, *Historia de la democracia cristiana en España*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1974), Vol. II, pp. 266–83; José María Gil Robles, *No fue posible la paz* (Barcelona, 1968), pp. 729 ff.; Joaquim Lleixá, *Cien años de militarismo en España: funciones estatales confiadas al Ejército en la Restauración y el franquismo* (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 197–247.

17 *El Debate*, 25 July, 28 October 1933; *El Socialista*, 29, 30 October 1933; Paul Preston, 'Alfonsine monarchism and the coming of the Spanish Civil War', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. II, nos. 3/4, 1972, pp. 100-2; Preston, *CSCW*, pp. 42–3, 46–50, 88; Martin Blinkhorn, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain 1931–1939* (Cambridge, 1975), pp. 163–81.

is even less noteworthy that the Franco war effort, backed by the Axis powers and with its Falangist façade, was seen by contemporaries, Spanish and foreign, as a fascist enterprise. The subsequent excesses of Nazism and the barbarization of warfare on the Eastern front, together with the assiduous efforts of Franco to dissociate himself from the Axis after 1943, did much to undermine this unqualified identification of Francoism with fascism. Indeed, in the last twenty years, scholars have dwelt on the fact that Francoism was not Hitlerism and have been influenced by the very unfascist development of Spain since 1957.[18] These deliberations have resulted in an increasingly widespread consensus that Francoism was *never* really fascism but rather some variant of limited, semi-pluralistic authoritarianism. The problem is not resolved by postulating, explicitly or implicitly, the view that the meaningful study of fascism in Spain should be limited to Falange Española.[19]

Such an approach is both understandable and unfortunate. It starts from the ostensibly laudable premise that contempt for the more reprehensible features of the Franco dictatorship should not permit the unscientific application to it of the term fascist merely as a means of political abuse. Moreover, while doubts are possible with regard to the fascist content of Renovación Española, the Comunión Tradicionalista and the CEDA, the fascist nature of the style, ideology and myths of the Falange are unquestionable. Accordingly, the narrow identification of Spanish fascism with Falange Española obviates the need for examination of the fascist features of other rightist groups and of the Franco regime itself. It is unfortunate because it renders Spanish fascism insignificant and uninteresting except for a period of about twelve months. Before the spring of 1936 the Falange Española was a diminutive organization of students and taxi-drivers. After April 1937 it was emasculated into a bureaucratic and patronage-dispensing machine in the service of Franco. As the Caudillo, in an uncharacteristic outburst of directness and levity, once explained to one of his ambassadors, 'the Falange is the claque which accompanies me on my journeys through Spain'. The easy relegation of the Falange to the fringes of the debate, whether by Franco himself or by scholars, is to forget both the fascist trappings and Axis alliances of Francoism and the activities of its repressive machinery between 1937 and 1945.

18 An extreme example of this tendency is Charles W. Anderson, *The Political Economy of Modern Spain: Policy-Making in an Authoritarian System* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1970).

19 Curiously, two authors of differing viewpoints have given titles to their studies of the Falange which imply that Spanish fascism is to be found exclusively in the Falange. Nevertheless, both imply a continuity between the pre-1937 FE de las JONS and the much wider post-1937 amalgam of FET y de las JONS. See Stanley G. Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford, 1961) and Sheelagh M. Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era* (London, 1987). See also the fascinating article by Juan J. Linz, 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain' in E. Allardt and Y. Littunen (eds), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki, 1964).

This is not the only reason for suspicion of the exclusivist definition of fascism in Spain. Awareness that fascism can be a term of abuse as well as of political definition cuts both ways.[20] An eagerness to exonerate the Franco regime from the taint of fascism can go with a readiness to forget that, after coming to power through a civil war which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and forced hundreds of thousands more into exile, the dictatorship executed at least a quarter of a million people, maintained concentration camps and labour battalions and sent troops to fight for Hitler on the Russian front. Under any circumstances, the confident exclusion both of prewar Spanish rightists other than the Falange and of the Franco regime from a discussion of fascism could be justified only if fascism is taken to be synonymous with Nazism at its most extreme, complete with racialist bestiality. Such a view, since it leads logically to the suggestion that Mussolini's Italy was not really fascist, is so rigid as to be useless.[21]

It is a basic assumption of this chapter that the paradigmatic movement and regime which must be considered generically fascist are those of Mussolini. That is not to say that the search for Spanish fascism should be inflexibly restricted to the quest for similarities with Italy. After all, for all their common features, most fascist movements, except those created in the wake of German occupation, were responses to national crises and drew on national traditions. Thus, if Nazism and Fascism, with all their differences, can be accepted as the German and Italian counter-revolutionary responses to crises of German and Italian society, then a case can be made for the rightist groups which backed the rebels in the Civil War to be considered collectively as the equivalent Spanish counter-revolutionary response to a crisis of Spanish society. The deep structural problems of Germany, Italy and Spain between the 1870s and the First World War did, after all, demonstrate a degree of similarity. Despite enormous differences in terms of levels of economic development, all three experienced the tensions consequent upon a backward political regime fending off challenges from both a dynamic bourgeoisie and a militant working class.[22]

This is not to forget significant differences. Unlike Germany and Italy, Spain did not participate in the First World War. In consequence, there simply did not exist masses of demobilized veterans to swell the ranks

20 Arno J. Mayer, *Dynamics of Counterrevolution in Europe: An Analytical Framework* (New York, 1971), p. 1.

21 See Stanley G. Payne, *Fascism: Comparison and Definition* (Wisconsin, 1980) pp. 101–4.

22 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *The German Empire 1871–1918* (Leamington Spa, 1985), pp. 71–99; David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History* (Oxford, 1984), pp. 91–7, 238–41 and *passim*; John A. Davis, *Gramsci and Italy's Passive Revolution* (London, 1979), pp. 11–61.

of paramilitary organizations. Nor was there a national psychosis of defeat. Both of those factors contributed to the biggest difference of all – the pre-eminent political role played by the army in the defence of right-wing interests against leftist challenges. On the other hand, the war brought massive social and economic dislocation to an already conflictive Spain, albeit not quite on the scale of Germany and Italy. The subsequent revolutionary ferment in the industrial North and the rural South deeply traumatized Spain's ruling classes. In many respects, the Spanish crisis of 1917–23 is analogous to the Italian crisis of 1917–22. That crisis was merely anaesthetized by the dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera. It re-emerged with greater intensity in the conditions of the economic depression of the 1930s. The belief gained currency in Spain, as it had done earlier in Italy and Germany, that the existing political order could no longer adequately guarantee the economic interests of the middle and upper classes. It was then that the search was renewed for some extraordinary means of defending those interests. Since the Spanish army had already assumed that role in the late nineteenth century, and done so even more after the loss of Cuba in 1898, it was hardly surprising that its services should be called upon in 1917, in 1923 and again in 1936.

It is often pointed out that Spain did not suffer the same crisis of national identity as that undergone by Italy and Germany as a result of the inadequacies of their unification processes and of their respective disappointments in the aftermath of the First World War. On the other hand, the shock of defeat in the Spanish-American War and the loss of the last remnants of empire had far-reaching effects. The Regenerationist movement which grew up in the wake of the disaster had a profound influence on the thinking of the Spanish right well into the Franco years. Nostalgia for empire was common to all rightist groups in the 1930s but was fiercest in the Falange. Falangists openly claimed that imperial conquest was a means of diverting the class struggle and were anxious to join the Axis war effort in order to reopen Spain's imperial account.[23] The main legacy of Regenerationism was the belief that defeat in 1898 was the fault of a political system marked by corruption and incompetence. A better future was associated with a patriotic cleansing of politics and reform imposed from above. Ultimately, this was to breed an anti-parliamentary authoritarianism. Early hopes were pinned on the great conservative politician, Antonio Maura. After his withdrawal from political life his followers, including José Calvo Sotelo and Antonio Goicoechea, switched their allegiance to General Primo de Rivera and were later prominent in Renovación Española. Another line from Regenerationism to the Falange, and particularly the imperialist

23 José María de Areilza y Fernando María Castiella, *Reivindicaciones de España* (Madrid, 1941).

emphasis, passed from the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, via his manic vulgarizer, Ernesto Giménez Caballero, to the dictator's son, José Antonio Primo de Rivera.

A further important difference between Spain, on the one hand, and Italy and Germany, on the other, resides in the fact that Franco was not defeated in an external war and maintained his dictatorship for thirty years after 1945. Since neither Nazism nor Fascism survived, it would be counter-factual absurdity to speculate that either might have evolved as did the Franco regime. Nevertheless, taking into account such unavoidable contrasts as their dissimilar levels of economic growth before 1930, Marshall Plan aid and their post-1945 polities, the similarities between Italy and Spain are eye-catching. To stress them, given these differences, is no doubt an ahistoric exercise. Yet there is an equally ahistorical assumption involved in the comparisons of Franco and Hitler and Mussolini on the basis of the chronological totality of all three regimes. The fact that the Franco regime, in response to changing international realities, evolved away from its overtly pro-Axis position after 1943 is implicitly taken by some commentators retrospectively to absolve Franco from a fascist past that diminished in importance the longer he lived beyond it. It would of course be foolish not to acknowledge that the Franco regime evolved. However, it is equally absurd to assume that the executions, the concentration camps, the imperialist fantasies and the Axis influence on Spanish politics in the 1940s are somehow massaged away by the Opus Dei developmentalism of the 1960s. *Mutatis mutandis*, like should be compared with like. Franco may be deemed not to have been a fascist, in the strictest scientific terms. Nevertheless it has to be considered that, in the light of the scale of the post Civil War repression, he stands comparison with the cruellest dictators of the century, in Latin America as well as Europe.

Broad areas of coincidence arguably outweigh the specific differences between Spain and Italy, if not Germany. This is true not only of the Franco and Mussolini regimes. There are comparisons also to be made between pre-1922 Italian Fascism and the various Spanish rightist groups before 1936, both individually and collectively. It is not simply a question of the ritual trappings associated with fascism, although Roman salutes, strutting, chanting, rallies and paramilitary formations were common enough in Spain before 1936 as they were to be under Franco. There are more interesting comparisons to be made between Spain and Italy, particularly in the light of the far greater differences existing between Italian Fascism and German Nazism. The Unification of 1937 and the emasculation and bureaucratization of the radical Falange had their parallel in the fusion of fascists, nationalists and monarchists in 1923. There are fascinating similarities between the social support, ideological objectives and crucial importance to their respective causes

of the agrarian Fascists and the agrarian CEDA.[24] Equally, there are valid comparisons to be made between Renovación Española and the Italian Nationalist Association, both in their relationships to the more radical, populist Falange and Fascist Party and in the disproportionate role that their theorists were later to play in each of the dictatorships.

Nevertheless, the most striking resemblances are to be found between the two regimes. Here again, the liturgical paraphernalia, the militarized rallies in honour of the leadership principle, although they existed in both regimes and were significant, are not the really important similarities. No more so are the ideological coincidences, the glorification of peasant life, the rhetorical quest for the 'new man'. Far more crucial are the similarities based on political, social and economic realities. The areas in which some commentators have seen Mussolini falling short of 'full-scale' fascism, that is to say, of a notional approximation to Nazism, are precisely where his régime coincides with that of Franco. Just as the existence of political and economic pressure groups created a narrowly restricted pluralism under Mussolini, so too did the Franco regime experience a constant jockeying for power and influence between economic interest groups and between generals, Falangists, Catholics, monarchists, the Opus Dei and other political factions. Needless to say, the relationship of forces was far from identical in both countries. Nevertheless, although differing in detail and emphasis, the role of the army, compromise with the church, the harnessing of party radicalism and the subordination of Fascist and Falangist syndicates to business interests all point to the survival of the pre-crisis establishment forces in each case. The rapidity with which Fascists and Falangists were to bewail the failure of their 'revolution' is a clear symptom of the extent to which both regimes, beyond their rhetoric and their professed intentions before gaining power, found their central functions in the protection and fostering of the existing economic order. The biggest difference between Spain and Italy was the importance of the parts played in each country by the army and fascist party in both the seizure of power and the subsequent regime.

In this regard, the opinion of contemporary fascists, both Italian and Spanish, is revealing. Virtually to a man, they accepted that Renovación Española and the CEDA shared the economic, social and political goals of fascism. In that regard, they believed that the conservative right had tried to modernize itself by 'fascistizing' its rhetoric and methods of operation. Where they saw differences was in the élitist disdain for mass mobilization

24 Three studies, out of many, on the agrarian origins of Italian fascism, which provoke startling comparisons with the social conflicts of southern Spain and with activities of the CEDA in Old Castile are Paul Corner, *Fascism in Ferrara 1915–1925* (Oxford, 1975); Frank M. Snowden, *The Fascist Revolution in Tuscany 1919–1922* (Cambridge, 1989); Anthony L. Cardoza, *Agrarian Elites and Italian Fascism: The province of Bologna 1901–1926* (Princeton, 1982).

of the monarchists of Renovación Española and in the Vaticanist loyalties of the CEDA. Mussolini did not believe that reliance on the army – which was shared by almost all groups on the Spanish right, including the Falange – was a properly 'fascist' way of proceeding. The Italian ambassador, Raffaele Guariglia, criticized the ideology of the CEDA as 'prehistoric', despite acknowledging that in its success with mass recruiting it might have been the basis for a Spanish fascist party. Guariglia saw José Calvo Sotelo as a 'filofascist'.[25] Gil Robles was, to put it mildly, ambiguous in his attitudes. He visited Italy in January 1933, frequently praised the achievements of Mussolini and permitted his own youth movement, the Juventud de Acción Popular, to behave like a fascist party, with its uniforms, mass rallies and adoption of fascist slogans. However, he had reservations about fascist pantheism. Even so, Gil Robles's participation in the 1933 election campaign during which he spoke of founding a New State and purging the fatherland of 'judaizing freemasons' led José Antonio Primo de Rivera to praise his fascist principles and to applaud the 'fascist warmth' of his style. Yet, in the same prewar parliamentary debate in which Calvo Sotelo declared himself a fascist, Gil Robles expressed doubts about what he saw as fascism's elements of state socialism.[26] For Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, the radical founder of the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, it was a question of traditional conservatives 'fascistizing' themselves, impregnating their rhetoric with fascist elements in order to deceive the masses into supporting them. Even during the Civil War both Mussolini and his first ambassador to Franco, Roberto Cantalupo, were happy to encourage Franco's efforts to 'fascistize' Spain.[27] What this implies is that Calvo Sotelo, Gil Robles and Franco did not merit the seal of approbation of Mussolini or that of Ledesma Ramos. Plainly, none of the three could plausibly emulate the self-perception of Mussolini and Ledesma Ramos as real revolutionaries. That does not wipe away the broad area of coincidence between their social, economic and political ambitions.

Having widened the scrutiny of fascism in Spain beyond the narrow confines of Falange Española, the inquiry should not in any case be limited to the accumulation of similarities between Italy and Spain. Each national counter-revolutionary project must be permitted its individual characteristics. These derived in part from the country's particular traditions of patriotic and conservative rhetoric. More fundamentally, however, the essential character of a given fascist movement and an institutionalized

25 Raffaele Guariglia, *Ambasciata in Spagna e primi passi in diplomazia 1932–1934* (Naples, 1972) pp. 259, 321, 347; Ismael Saz Campos, *Mussolini contra la II República* (Valencia, 1986) pp. 51, 57–66.

26 *El Debate*, 17 October 1933; Preston, *CSCW*, p. 214; *Diario de las Sesiones de Cortes*, 19 May 1936.

27 Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, *¿Fascismo en España?* (Barcelona, 1968) pp. 70–3; Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República* p. 222.

fascist regime arose out of the special nature of the crisis that it was their function to resolve. Inevitably, the existence of Soviet communism gave all fascisms a common focus of fear and enmity, just as the vicissitudes of the international economy gave rise to other points of coincidence. Every bit as important as those influences, however, were the national circumstances of social and economic crisis which led to traditional conservative forces being deemed no longer adequate to defend oligarchical interests within bourgeois democracy. The chronological moment at which that happened and the extent to which the threat that they faced came from real or perceived revolution or simply from the achievements of reformist socialism at a time of economic contraction varied from one country to another. Accordingly, any account of a national counter-revolutionary alliance must be informed by an awareness of the nature and development of the corresponding capitalism to which it was linked.

In the fifty years prior to the emergence of fascism Spanish capitalism experienced even greater imbalances than its Italian counterpart.[28] There were modern and dynamic banking and industrial sectors but they were isolated and anything but hegemonic. The dominant force in Spanish capitalism was the agrarian oligarchy. It exerted a virtual monopoly of national politics and, until 1917, controlled an uneven partnership in which industrialists and bankers were the junior partners. That monopoly was built upon the twin pillars of a system of electoral falsification based on the social power of local landlords and the repressive power of the forces of order: the Civil Guard and, at moments of greater tension, the army. Challenges to the system arose in the wake of the country's industrialization. Despairing rural uprisings were supplanted by the strike actions of a militant industrial proletariat. However, when the inevitable explosion came, it was precipitated not by the working class but by the industrial bourgeoisie. The economic boom consequent upon Spain's economically advantageous position as a neutral during the First World War saw coalmine-owners, steel barons, shipbuilders, and textile magnates enjoying the takeoff of Spanish industry. The balance of power within the economic élite shifted somewhat. Agrarian interests remained pre-eminent but industrialists were no longer prepared to tolerate their subordinate political position and even toyed with making a bid for political modernization.

The reforming ambitions of industrialists and bankers enriched by the war coincided with an intensification of militancy amongst a proletariat impoverished by wartime shortages and inflation. The Socialist Unión General de Trabajadores and the anarcho-syndicalist Confederación

28 There is a growing bibliography on the agrarian problem and capitalist underdevelopment in Spain. For a provocative recent survey, see Enrique Prieto, *Agricultura y atraso en la España contemporánea* (Madrid, 1988).

Nacional del Trabajo were drawn into an uneasy revolutionary alliance in the hope that a joint general strike would overthrow a corrupt system. While industrialists and workers pushed for change, middle-rank army officers were protesting at low wages, antiquated promotion structures and the political corruption which they blamed for colonial defeat and military inefficiency. Voicing their complaints in the rhetoric of 1898 Regenerationism, the officers were acclaimed as the figureheads of a great national reform movement. Had the movement been united in purpose it might well have supplanted the Restoration system and established a democratic polity capable of permitting social adjustment and defusing the embittered class conflicts of the day. As it was, its contradictions were easily exploited by the establishment. The officers were peeled off from the reform movement by concessions on their complaints about pay and the promotions system. The UGT and the CNT were split by the skilful provocation of a premature strike of socialist railway workers. Again at peace with the system, the army was happy to defend it in August 1917 by crushing the striking socialists, thereby causing considerable bloodshed. Alarmed by the prospect of proletarian revolution, industrialists and bankers muted their own demands for political reform and, lured by promises of economic modernization, joined in a national coalition government in 1918 with the old oligarchical Liberal and Conservative Parties. The readiness with which the army had protected the system ensured that the great revolutionary crisis of 1917 led merely to a readjustment of the power balance between the landed oligarchy and the industrial and banking bourgeoisie.[29]

The fact that the industrial bourgeoisie renewed its partnership with the landed oligarchy guaranteed that, from 1918 onwards, Spain would be divided starkly into two fiercely hostile social groups, with landowners and industrialists on one side and workers and landless labourers on the other. For five years, until the army intervened again, social ferment sporadically reached the scale of undeclared civil war. During the 'three bolshevik years' from 1918 to 1921 uprisings by anarchist day-labourers in the South were put down by the combination of the Civil Guard and the army. In the North too, as industrialists in Catalonia, the Basque country and Asturias tried to ride the immediate postwar recession with wage cuts and lay-offs, there were violent strikes and, in Barcelona, a terrorist spiral of provocations and reprisals.[30] The Restoration political system was perceived as having ceased to be an adequate mechanism for defending the economic interests of the ruling classes. At this point, the

29 Juan Antonio Lacomba Avellán, *La crisis española de 1917* (Madrid, 1970); Carolyn Boyd, *Praetorian Politics in Liberal Spain* (Chapel Hill, 1979); pp. 44–93; Gerald H. Meaker, *The Revolutionary Left in Spain 1914–1923* (Stanford, 1974), pp. 62–98.

30 A revealing, often inadvertently so, account of the yellow union, the *Sindicatos Libres*, which contributed considerably to the break-down of law and order in Barcelona,

army intervened again, a *coup d'état* being carried out by General Primo de Rivera.[31]

As Captain-General of Barcelona, intimate of Catalan textile barons and himself a large southern landowner, Primo was the ideal praetorian defender of the reactionary coalition of industrialists and landowners consolidated after 1917. Primo's regime was mildly repressive, outlawing the CNT, but securing Socialist co-operation. Moreover, the dictatorship enjoyed a degree of prosperity deriving partly from a general European upturn but also from a massive investment in infrastructural development. Accordingly, the Primo de Rivera period came to be regarded in later years as a golden age by the Spanish middle and upper classes. The idea of a successful military monarchy became a central myth of the reactionary right, cherished by the ideologues of Francoism.[32] Ironically, its short-term effect was to discredit the idea of authoritarianism in Spain. Primo's attempt to perpetuate his authoritarian system by means of a single party, the Unión Patriótica, was a resounding failure although it did provide a link from the military monarchy to the right-wing parties of the Second Republic.[33] In addition to his failure to create an enduring apparatus of authoritarianism, the dictator's amiably paternalist improvisations inadvertently alienated landowners, industrialists, the church hierarchy and some of the élite officer corps of the army. A window of opportunity opened for the left. Crucially, Primo's attempts to reform the military and in particular .to standardize promotion machinery ensured that the army would stand aside when a great coalition of socialists and middle-class Republicans swept to power on 14 April 1931.

The nostalgic rightists who had served the dictatorship were impelled to reflect on the importance of the army. Through the journal *Acción Española* and the party Renovación Española, they were to form the general staff of the extreme right in the Second Republic and were to provide much of the ideological content of the Franco regime. It was not lost on them that the army had defended rightist interests in

is Colin M. Winston, *Workers and the Right in Spain, 1900–1936* (Princeton, 1985). See also León-Ignacio, *Los años del pistolerismo* (Barcelona, 1981); Manuel Casal Gómez, *'La Banda negra': el origen y la actuación de los pistoleros en Barcelona (1918–1921)* (Barcelona, 1977); Angel Pestaña, *Terrorismo en Barcelona: memorias inéditas* (Barcelona, 1979).

31 On the coup, see the recent study by Javier Tusell, *Radiografía de un golpe de Estado: el ascenso al Poder del general Primo de Rivera* (Madrid, 1987). On the regime, see Shlomo Ben Ami, *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain 1923–1930* (Oxford, 1983).

32 The Primo de Rivera dictatorship was seen as 'the selfless effort of one man to save Spain from the chaos of democracy', *Acción Española*, 1 February 1932: Eduardo Aunós, *Primo de Rivera: soldado y gobernante* (Madrid, 1944); Raúl Morodo, *Los orígenes ideológicos del franquismo: Acción Española* (Madrid, 1985), pp. 31–9.

33 José María Pemán, *El hecho y la idea de Unión Patriótica* (Madrid, 1929); Shlomo Ben Ami, 'The forerunners of Spanish Fascism: Unión Patriótica and Unión Monárquica', *European Studies Review*, vol. 9, no. 1, January 1979.

1917 and 1923 and, by failing to do so in 1931, permitted the bloodless establishment of the Republic. Accordingly, they began to court the army, directing their efforts to persuading officers that an uprising was both legitimate and necessary. The failure of Primo's dictatorship had found the upper classes temporarily bereft of political formations capable of defending them from the adjustment of social and political privilege implicit in the coming of the Republic. The political strategists of the right were determined that the same mistake should not be repeated. After all, the consequences of military passivity in 1931 were enormous. The elections of April and June 1931 saw political power pass to the socialists and their urban middle-class allies, the republican lawyers and intellectuals. They intended to use this suddenly acquired share of state power to create a modern Spain by destroying the reactionary influence of the church and the army but, above all, by far-reaching agrarian reform. This was intended not only to improve the immediate conditions of the wretched *braceros* but also to create a prosperous peasantry as a future market for Spanish industry.

In this sense the Republic was potentially the agent of the economic take-off that Spain's bankers, merchants and industrialists had been historically incapable of realizing. Yet the new regime could not count on their support. This was partly because of the close historic ties between industry and land which had been intensified during the revolutionary upheavals of 1917–23. It was also a reflection of the immediate conditions of the Second Republic. The combination of a context of world depression and a substantial increase in the size and influence of trade unions was hardly likely to encourage adventurism among industrialists. In Catalonia and the Basque country the enthusiasm for the Republic's reformism and federalism among liberal intellectuals and regional nationalists was not shared by the economic élites. At best there was some grudging tolerance for the Republic among the more progressive light industrialists. However, their tentative welcome to the Republic, extended with trepidation and often instantaneous regret, was countered by the reactions of the *hautes bourgeoisies* of Catalonia and the Basque country.[34] Most industrialists and bankers agreed with the rightist press that the Republic was a dangerous revolutionary regime. This was confirmed both by the legal activities of industrial employers' pressure groups which were disruptive and subversive and by the fact that Basque industrialists were almost as prominent

34 Bernat Muniesa, *La burguesía catalana ante la II República española*, 2 vols (Barcelona, 1985), Vol. I, pp. 180–255 and Vol. II, *passim*; Antoni Jutglar, *Historia crítica de la burguesía en Cataluña* (Barcelona, 1984), pp. 437–58; Manuel González Portilla and José María Garmendia, *La guerra civil en el País Vasco* (Madrid, 1988) pp. 84–94; Manuel González Portilla and José María Garmendia, *La Posguerra en el País Vasco: política, acumulación, miseria* (San Sebastián, 1988), *passim*.

as landowners in the financing of both Renovación Española and the Falange.[35]

Thus the Republic faced the unremitting hostility of both partners in Spain's reactionary coalition. The economic power of industrialists and landowners remained undiminished by the transition from monarchy to Republic. On the other hand, they had lost their monopoly of political power and were determined to use all the social and economic weapons at their disposal to regain their control of the apparatus of the state. As a result of the relatively honest elections of 1931 the working classes and the urban petty bourgeoisie were now in a position to fulfil their minimal social and political aspirations. Within months of the foundation of the new regime, the Republican-socialist coalition government had introduced reforms which fundamentally challenged the pre-1931 social and economic structure. The intention behind this initial social legislation had been to alleviate the misery of the southern day-labourers or *braceros*. However, the inefficient latifundia system depended for its economic survival on the existence of a reserve army of *braceros* paid starvation wages. The introduction of the eight-hour day where previously men had worked from sun-up to sun-down, and of arbitration committees to regulate wages and working conditions, infuriated the *latifundistas*. With the depression forcing down agricultural prices, the consequent wage increases, minimal though they were, signified a potentially significant redistribution of wealth. Traditional means of keeping wages down, the introduction of cheap outside labour and the rural lock-out, were rendered difficult by the decrees of municipal boundaries and obligatory cultivation. With day-labourers flooding into the UGT's Landworkers' Federation and UGT leader Francisco Largo Caballero as Minister of Labour, the southern landowners felt as besieged as did those of the Po valley when faced with the ambitious advances of the Federterra after the First World War.[36]

Although Catalan textile manufacturers and light industrialists benefited from the increase in the peasantry's disposable income, heavy industrialists in the Basque country and mine-owners from Asturias were as badly hit as the *latifundistas* by the depression and by the increase in trade union power and confidence. They rapidly began to seek new ways of defending economic interests which had never before been subject to legal threats such as those mounted by the Republic. The methods adopted to combat the problems posed by the establishment of a functioning mass democracy took two forms, one legal, the other violent. Despite the

35 Mercedes Cabrera, *La patronal ante la II República: organizaciones y estrategia* (Madrid, 1983), pp. 274–86; Javier Jiménez Campo, *El fascismo en la crisis de la segunda República española* (Madrid, 1979), pp. 197–215.

36 Paul Preston, 'The agrarian war in the south' in Paul Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain 1931–1939* (London, 1984); Manuel Pérez Yruela, *La conflictividad campesina en la provincia de Córdoba 1931–1936* (Madrid, 1979), pp. 108–214.

ostensible differences between them, especially in terms of day-to-day tactics, their overall strategies were complementary and their long-term objectives virtually identical. The legal defence of oligarchical interests involved the mobilization of a mass rightist movement to match the numerical strength of the left. That led eventually to the creation of the Catholic authoritarian Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas. In contrast to its attempt to gain power and establish a corporative state by electoral means, the so-called 'catastrophists', the Carlists, the monarchists of Renovación Española and the Falange were explicitly committed to the outright destruction of the parliamentary regime.

Given the bitterness of class conflict in Spain, there was never much possibility of any significant section of the working classes being mobilized by rightist groups. All efforts made in that direction during the Second Republic were failures. The one substantial social group that was susceptible to right-wing manipulation consisted of the rural lower middle classes. Efforts to mobilize smallholders against the rising power of the urban and rural working class had already achieved considerable success. The Confederación Nacional Católico-Agraria, financed by big landowners, had half a million members before the Primo de Rivera dictatorship seemed to render it superfluous.[37] Its influence was, however, inherited by Acción Nacional, a mass Catholic political organization founded within a week of the fall of the monarchy and devoted to resistance against any change in the religious, social, or economic order. Under the dynamic leadership of the young monarchist, José María Gil Robles, Acción Popular, as it became in 1932, undertook blanket propagandda campaigns to convince the conservative smallholders that the Republic's attempts to break the social power of the Church constituted outright religious persecution and that projected agrarian reform was directed at them as much as at the big landowners.

Vast sums of money were spent convincing these poor but proud farmers that the Republic would proletarianize them. When Acción Popular absorbed similar rightist organizations in early 1933 and became the CEDA it could count its support in millions. These supporters were consistently presented with the most virulently anti-Republican propaganda as part of a process whereby they were being groomed to fight the left for what Gil Robles called 'possession of the street'. Mass rallies were staged at which the audiences were pushed to rabid hostility to the parliamentary regime. In 1937, and also in his memoirs, Gil Robles claimed that the reserves of anti-Republican belligerence thus created made possible Franco's Civil War victory.[38] Despite the intensity of its anti-Republicanism the CEDA

37 The outstanding study of the CNCA is Juan José Castillo, *Propietarios muy pobres: sobre la subordinación política del pequeño campesino* (Madrid, 1979).

38 *Sur* (Málaga) 25, 28 April 1937; Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, pp. 64–5, 719, 728–30.

remained within the bounds of legality. However, an open admiration for both Italian fascism and German Nazism indicated the fragility of its legalism. Hitler and Mussolini were admired for fulfilling the tasks that the CEDA had set itself: the destruction of socialism and communism, the abolition of liberal parliamentarism and the establishment of the corporative state.[39]

Gil Robles's short-term aim was to block the reforming ambitions of the Republic. Before his considerable electoral success in 1933, this was done by a skilful programme of parliamentary filibustering. Afterwards, when he had sufficient strength to control the policies of a series of Radical and Radical-CEDA ministries, it took the form of a sweeping abolition of the Republic's social legislation. Gil Robles's objective before the 1933 elections had been the legal establishment of the corporative state as a permanent defence against the left. When his victory was insufficient he switched to the more sinuous tactic of gradually breaking up the Radical Party by means of a series of well-orchestrated cabinet crises, in the hope that he would eventually be called upon to form a government. At the same time the savage reversal of working-class living standards was a second string to his bow. If a left-wing rising could be provoked a corporative state could be imposed in the aftermath of its suppression.[40] In the event, the insurrection of October 1934 was put down with such difficulty that hopes for a rapid introduction of the corporative state were dropped in favour of a return to the slower legalist tactic. Gil Robles's hopes were finally dashed in late 1935 when a miscalculated cabinet crisis led not to his becoming prime minister but to the calling of elections.[41]

The relative success of Gil Robles in reasserting the pre-1931 social order created the left-wing unity that was to be the foundation of the Popular Front's electoral victory in February 1936. The Asturian insurrection of October 1934 had already indicated the impossibility of a peaceful imposition of a corporative state. The Popular Front elections signified the definitive failure of the CEDA's efforts to use democracy against itself. Henceforth the landed and industrial oligarchies sought a less hazardous and permanent form of protection. They began to switch their financial support to the 'catastrophist' right. At the same time the uniformed masses of the CEDA's radical youth movement began to flood into the Falange and, to a lesser extent, the Carlist movement.[42] The paymasters of catastrophism, of course, had pinned their hopes on the army.

39 *El Debate*, 4, 17, 25 August 1933, 2, 8, 10, 11, 22 March 1934.

40 Gil Robles, *No fue posible*, p. 131; Preston, *CSCW*, pp. 122–6.

41 Joaquín Chapaprieta Torregrosa, *La paz fue posible: memorias de un político* (Barcelona, 1971) pp. 207–332; Preston, *CSCW*, pp. 162–9.

42 Payne, *Falange*, pp. 104–5; Blinkhorn, *Carlism*, p. 257; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Entre Hendaya y Gibraltar* (Madrid, 1947), p. 25.

The end of illusions about the legal establishment of corporativism by the CEDA gave a welcome lease of life to the ailing Falange. It made little difference to the other 'catastrophist' organizations, Renovación Española and the Carlist Comunión Tradicionalista, except to confirm what they had long predicted. The Carlists in particular were little affected by day-to-day developments in Republican politics. Maniacally anti-modern and devoted to the establishment of a theocratic monarchy, their commitment to the violent destruction of the laic Republic was unswerving. Locked in their Navarrese strongholds, they tended to stand aloof from the rest of the right, although they did make two significant contributions to it. The more obvious was the provision of their fanatical militia, the *Requeté*, to the right-wing cause in the Civil War. The less obvious one was to provide a body of indigenous reactionary doctrine which permitted other rightists to defend fashionable authoritarian and fascist notions as authentically Spanish.[43]

Gil Robles's defeat provided the context for the military rising to which the main activities of Renovación Española were directed. Like Gil Robles and José Antonio Primo de Rivera, its leaders had been members of Primo's Unión Patriótica and of the Unión Monárquica Nacional, founded in 1930 to fill the gap left by the demise of the oligarchical parties of the restoration period. Once young activists of the pre-1923 monarchical political élite, they believed that the monarchy failed because it was tainted with liberal constitutionalism. Accordingly, they sought new means of defending upper-class interests. Devotees of General Primo de Rivera, their ideal was a corporative state under a military monarchy although they were receptive to other solutions to the problem of the rise of the left-wing masses. Sporting a small radical youth movement and even belonging to Acción Popular until late 1932, the authoritarian monarchists were repelled by populist politics and inclined towards incisive and élitist schemes to deal with the leftist threat. Renovación Española was thus conceived of as a front organization to spread the idea of the legitimacy of a military rising against the Republic, to inject a spirit of rebellion into the army and to provide a cover for fund-raising, arms purchases and conspiracy. That the defence of the social order had priority over the preservation of the monarchy was made clear by the group's plans for the future, which were a remarkably prophetic blueprint for the Franco regime. Intensely sympathetic to Italian fascism, Eduardo Aunós and José Calvo Sotelo had travelled widely in search of models for the defence of the existing order and had returned enthusiastic advocates of the corporative regimentation of labour and the economy.[44] However, their disdain for

43 Blinkhorn, *Carlism*, pp. 141–82.
44 Preston, 'Alfonsine monarchism', pp. 103–4; Eduardo Aunós, *Calvo Sotelo y la política de su tiempo* (Madrid, 1941), pp. 115–55.

the masses, whom they held responsible for the excesses of democracy, restrained any inclination that they might have had towards full-scale fascist populism.

It was not surprising that members of the Renovación Española group should be happy to subsidize the Falange. Having no mass base themselves, the monarchists saw the Falange as potential cannon fodder for street fighting with the left and as an instrument of political destabilization to spread an atmosphere of insecurity and provide justification for a military rising.[45] In addition, the presence of the dictator's son José Antonio at the head of the Falange was a useful guarantee to industrialists and particularly to landowners. The sort of reassurance that the aristocratic young Primo de Rivera provided to southern landlords was duplicated for the Basque *haute bourgeoisie* by the wealthy Bilbao engineer José Maria de Areilza. In fact, for all its anti-conservative rhetoric, the limits of Falangist radicalism were clear enough. The more outspoken lumpenproletariat elements from the Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, with which the Falange merged in early 1934, were quickly brought under control. Moreover, even Jonsista criticisms of the moral and spiritual mediocrity of the bourgeois establishment never extended into attacks on the capitalist system of production. The emptiness of the Falange's revolutionary sloganizing was revealed by its participation in the repression of the left after the October 1934 rising and, most blatantly, by its role in the Civil War.[46]

Before 1936 the Falange was unable to develop a significant mass following because its natural constituency, the rural lower middle classes, had already been recruited by the CEDA. It was to lose the financial backing of the monarchists of Renovación Española, not because of any rhetorical left-wing sloganizing, but simply because of the personal rivalries between José Antonio Primo de Rivera and José Calvo Sotelo. Although other allegedly radical elements of the Falange were happy to do so, José Antonio refused to join Calvo Sotelo's rightist coalition, the Bloque Nacional. Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, for instance, was not so intransigent as to refuse the gift of a motor bike from the monarchists.[47] Unable to recruit the masses and shorn of financial support, the Falange managed to survive in part thanks to cash from the Italian government, although this should not be taken as an exclusive seal of fascist approval since both the Carlists and Renovación Española were also objects of Mussolini's goodwill.[48]

45 For a wider theoretical discussion of the relationship between traditional conservatives and radical fascisms, see Mayer, *Dynamics*, pp. 98–101.
46 Ricardo Chueca, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco: Un estudio sobre FET-JONS* (Madrid, 1983) *passim*; Ellwood, *Spanish Fascism*, pp. 29–47.
47 Ismael Saz, 'Tres acotaciones a propósito de los origenes, desarrollo y crisis del fascismo español' in *Revista de Estudios Políticos* (Madrid) Nueva Epoca, No. 50, Marzo-Abril 1986; Pedro Sainz Rodríguez, *Testimonio y recuerdos* (Barcelona, 1978), p. 220.
48 Saz, *Mussolini contra la II República*, pp. 64–85.

While the Falange was in the doldrums the main burden of oligarchical effort was directed towards bringing the CEDA masses within the more aggressive orbit of Renovación Española. This was to be done through the device of the Bloque Nacional. Under the leadership of Calvo Sotelo the Bloque Nacional in theory perfectly anticipated the Francoist Unificación. In practice, both Gil Robles and José Antonio Primo de Rivera stood aside. There was a strong element of personal rivalry at work in this. José Antonio resented the way in which Calvo Sotelo had stolen his ideological baggage in advocating fascist solutions to the Spanish crisis. Aristocratic disdain was revealed in his judgement that Calvo Sotelo could never lead a movement of national salvation because of his inadequate horsemanship.[49] Personal friction also existed between Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo. However, if formal unity was hindered by personal considerations, the left-wing triumph in the elections of Feburary 1936 created a context in which practical unity became an urgent necessity.

The left was now determined to carry out the reforms which had been so successfully thwarted by the CEDA. The obvious challenge to oligarchical interests led to a remarkable closing of ranks on the right. Renovación Española's leadership intensified pressure for military intervention and diverted funds to the Falange for a programme of political destabilization. Attacks on the left by the Falange and members of the Juventud de Acción Popular were used by Gil Robles and Calvo Sotelo as the basis for spine-chilling parliamentary speeches which alleged that Spain was in the grip of anarchy. The middle and upper classes were thereby terrorized into a belief that only the army could save them. The roles of Carlists, Falangists and Renovación Española in the final preparations for the long-awaited catastrophe were almost predictable. More interesting was the behaviour of the CEDA. Although it was the most successful mass political party of the right, and had been created specifically to counter the left in the electoral arena, when the crisis came, most of its leaders and the bulk of its rank and file reverted to the reflex response of the Spanish right under threat. Along with the catastrophists who had been trying to pave the way for a *coup d'état*, they turned to the army. Having once accepted that legalism had failed, Gil Robles did nothing to stop the flow of his followers to more extreme organizations. He handed over the CEDA's electoral funds to the army conspirators and ordered the party's rank and file to place itself under military orders as soon as the rising began. He praised fascist violence as a patriotic response to the alleged crimes of the left. Although much praised for his legalism, Gil Robles did

49 Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, *¿Fascismo en España?*, 2nd edn (Barcelona, 1968) pp. 161–5; Ian Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 1980), p. 108; Payne, *Falange*, pp. 61–8; Juan Antonio Ansaldo, *¿Para qué...? (de Alfonso XIII a Juan III* (Buenos Aires, 1951), pp. 76–8.

not hesitate to throw his weight behind those who aimed to establish the authoritarian corporative state by violence.

The smooth orchestration of the efforts of both 'catastrophists' and legalists in the spring of 1936 induced many on the left to see the CEDA, Renovación Española, the Carlists and the Falange as regiments in the same army. Throughout the Republic, leaders of each rightist group had addressed the meetings of the others and had usually been well received. Space was made available in party newspapers for favourable reports on the activities of rivals. All sections of the right shared the same determination to establish a corporative state and to destroy the effective forces of the left. They were all the servants of the landed and heavy industrial oligarchies in so far as they depended on them for financial backing, and all their political activities were directed towards the protection of oligarchical interests. There were, of course, differences of opinion and they occasionally led to public polemic. Nevertheless, they rarely went beyond discussions over tactics, and then usually over what seemed to the others to be the excessive legalism of the CEDA. These groups rarely broke unity in parliament, at election times or, most crucially, during the Civil War – a stark contrast with the divisions that split the left both in peace and in war. Indeed, it was not uncommon, particularly among the provincial rural bourgeoisie, to belong to more than one, or in some cases all, of these organizations.

Both separately and together, all these groups constituted attempts to resolve the crisis in which the Spanish landed and industrial oligarchies found themselves as a result of left-wing pressure for change. The acuteness of that crisis was partly a consequence of the international situation but it was even more the result of the landed oligarchy's success in holding back change for nearly a century. After the collapse of restoration politics and the ultimate failure of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship new methods had to be sought to defend oligarchical privilege. It is primarily in this sense that the rightist organizations may be seen variously, and after February 1936 in conjunction, as manifestations of the peculiar Spanish counter-revolutionary alliance. The primordial role of the army has sometimes been seen as suggesting that the nationalist uprising was not in any meaningful sense fascist. In fact, like other sections of the traditional right, the army had, to an extent, allowed itself to be 'fascistized'. Some army officers were card-carrying Falangists, the conspiratorial organization Unión Militar Española was unashamedly fascist in its rhetoric and, throughout the Civil War, the politics of the army were indistinguishable from contemporary fascisms.

Various differences and similarities between the Italian and Spanish experiences have already been outlined. One crucial difference which underscores similarities in other areas is the fact that the Spanish crisis came to a head fourteen years after Mussolini attained power. The Spanish

left had learnt the lesson of Italy, as it had learnt those of Portugal, Germany and Austria. There was no possibility of breaking the left with skirmishing *squadristi* in Spain. The Civil War was, in that context, the inevitable culmination of the attempt to impose adequate counter-revolutionary, authoritarian solutions, in more or less fascist style, to the Spanish crisis. In other words, not only historical tradition and existing patterns of civil–military relations, but also the strength of the Spanish working class and its determination to resist what it saw as fascism, dictated that the principal role in the defence of right-wing interests would be played by the army.

The fact that in the event the defence of the oligarchy led to all-out war inevitably gave the army an influence in the Franco regime that was not paralleled in Italy. For this reason the rhetoric of anti-oligarchical novelty was rather more subdued under Franco than under Mussolini. Nevertheless, with the rightist groups of the prewar period formally united into a single party, the Franco regime achieved the goals to which they all aspired – the corporative state, the abolition of free trade unions, the destruction of the left-wing press and political parties. Large numbers of working-class cadres were executed and many more put into concentration camps. The social domination of the big landlords was restored intact. Francoist economic policy in the 1940s consistently favoured the landed oligarchy, as was only to be expected.[50] This identification with the traditional oligarchy is one reason why the Franco regime is often assumed not to have been fascist. The continuing political dominance of the Spanish army throughout the dictatorship is another. However, it should not be forgotten that the officer corps was swamped by Falangists during the Civil War or that important regime functions, press, propaganda and syndical organization were in the hands of the Falange until the 1970s.

It is not without irony therefore that the Franco dictatorship, inadvertently fulfilling the modernizing function associated with fascist regimes, was to preside over the eclipse of the landed oligarchy and the final triumph of the industrial oligarchy. The repressive labour relations of the regime led to an accumulation of capital; its rabid anti-communism led to American aid. The combination of the two, in the favourable context of the late 1950s, led to Spain's second, and definitive, industrial take-off. By the 1970s the industrial élite came to regard the Franco regime as an irksome anachronism. Accordingly, industrialists and bankers were to be found coinciding with the democratic opposition in the quest for change. A right which had been sufficiently ruthless and versatile to use both Falangists and soldiers had changed. To safeguard the economic development of the

50 Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán, *La evolución del campesinado en España* (Barcelona, 1979), pp. 149–76.

1960s and 1970s the oligarchy was prepared to contemplate co-operation with the moderate left to permit the establishment of democracy. It is hardly surprising that bewildered ultra-rightist civilians and Falangist army officers huddled together in defence of a rhetorically fascist concept of the regime and in defiance of the wishes of the overwhelming majority of the population.

2

The politics of revenge: Francoism, the Civil War and collective memory

The historiography of modern Spain has been concerned with three major issues – the origins of the Spanish Civil War, the course of the Spanish Civil War and the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. In the interior, history under the Francoist dictatorship was a direct instrument of the state, written by policemen, soldiers and priests, invigilated by the powerful censorship machinery. It was the continuation of the war by other means, an effort to justify the military uprising, the war and the subsequent repression.[1] In contrast, among Republican emigrés and in the oblique writings of those who wrote from a kind of internal exile, there was an all-consuming quest for an explanation, rather than a justification, of the national tragedy. Examinations were undertaken of the Spanish 'mind', to explain the country's plethora of civil wars. Apparent continuities were easy enough to find. The idea that political problems are best settled by violence is a commonplace of Spanish history and literature. The aridity of the land, the harshness of the climate and the stark division of the country by mountain ranges were grist to the mill of this kind of *Kulturgeschichte*. Pre-Civil War political discourse was peppered with a vocabulary of bloody struggle and exhilarating conquest, legacies both of the reconquest of Spain from the Moors and of the colonial experience. The imagery of a broken Spain and of two Spains was habitual in the nineteenth century.

The consequent cultural/national character interpretations provided implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, teleological versions of Spain's history, characterizing the national past in terms of a propensity to pitiless blood-lust and savage discord. They fed off the similar attempts by the

1 See my article 'War of words: the Spanish Civil War and the historians' in Paul Preston (ed.), *Revolution and War in Spain 1931–1939* (London and New York, 1984). The most penetrating examination of Francoist historiography remains Herbert R. Southworth, *El mito de la cruzada de Franco* (Paris, 1963).

'generation of 1898' to grapple with the so-called *problema nacional*. The turmoil of frequent civil wars in the nineteenth century, the revolution of 1868, the chaos of the First Republic in 1873 and the loss of Cuba in 1898 had stimulated an endless picking through the national entrails. Spanish history was presented variously as an eternal contest between the orthodox and the heterodox, between Spain and anti-Spain, between the traditional and the modern, between *hispanidad* and *europeismo*, between Catholic and liberal values. After the Civil War of 1936–9 such brooding speculations were renewed with greater intensity. Among exiled Republicans it produced the monumental scholarly polemics of Américo Castro and Claudio Sánchez Albornoz.[2] The concerns of historians and philosophers were a reflection of those of the population as a whole. The scale of the trauma caused by the war rendered these later obsessions entirely comprehensible. They bore fruit even among repentant Falangist intellectuals.[3]

Less serious but altogether more pervasive were the products of regime propagandists who delved into the writings of 1898 at random for their own partisan selection of the cultural and racial components of 'Spanishness'. They found their most extreme forms in two pro-Francoist interpretations of Spain's history emanating from the Falange and the church. For the Falangists, what the past proved was that 'the Spanish way of being has always, in the finest hours of its history, been struggle'.[4] The idea that deep in the national character lay a propensity to exaltation, paroxysm, impetuousness, violence and aggression was joyfully reiterated by Francoist propagandists. The Caudillo and the Falange had seized upon it during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Civil War when an Axis-dominated world order seemed to be in the offing. It was fashionable to claim that the spirit which made the Civil War possible and which indeed secured victory for the Nationalists was one of imperialist conquest which harked back to the greatest days of Spain's history.[5] This linked up with the vision of the more militant clergy that the Civil War had been a religious war, a

2 An intriguing albeit vehemently partisan survey of such polemics can be found in Vicente Marrero, *La guerra española y el trust de cerebros* (Madrid, 1961), especially pp. 366–7. See also Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain: A Modern History* (London, 1961); Claudio Sánchez Albornoz, *España, un enigma histórico*, 2 vols (Buenos Aires, 1957); Américo Castro, *La realidad histórica de España*, 2nd edn (México D. F., 1962); Martin Blinkhorn, 'Spain: the "Spanish problem" and the imperial myth' in *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 15, no. 1, 1980.

3 Pedro Laín Entralgo, *España como problema*, 2nd edn (Madrid, 1957); Dionisio Ridruejo, *Escrito en España* (Buenos Aires, 1961); Pedro Laín Entralgo, *Descargo de conciencia (1930–1960)* (Barcelona, 1976).

4 Marrero, *La guerra*, p. 473; Ernesto Giménez Caballero, *Genio de España*, 7th edn (Madrid, 1971), pp. 167–78.

5 José María de Areilza and Fernando María Castiella, *Reivindicaciones de España* (Madrid, 1941) p. 23.

vision underwritten by a narrow interpretation of the past as a series of crusades.[6]

That was also, in 1939, a view shared by the Vatican. The telegram of congratulation from the newly elected Pius XII to Franco on his victory made identical historical assumptions: 'Lifting up our hearts to God, we sincerely thank Your Excellency for the desired Catholic victory in Spain. We pray that this most beloved country, once again at peace, will return with renewed vigour to the ancient and Christian traditions which made her great.' In an effusive broadcast message to the Spanish people on 16 April 1939 the pope declared that

> the designs of Providence, beloved children, have once more been made manifest over heroic Spain. The nation chosen by God as the principal instrument of the evangelization of the new world and as the impregnable bulwark of the Catholic faith has just given the proselytes of materialist atheism in our century the most sublime proof that the eternal values of religion and the spirit rise above all else.[7]

Although in fact diplomatic relations between Madrid and the Vatican were decidely cool at this time these messages were taken as a seal of approval for a savage repression presented as an effort to rechristianize Spain. The most obvious successes by way of rechristianization were chalked up by prison chaplains. They secured the confessions and sometimes the conversions of condemned men who were thus deemed to have died in a state of grace.[8]

The more or less racist vision which linked the Civil War to the crusading spirit of the wars between Christians and Moors and to the evangelical imperialism of the conquest of America was to be inflicted on Spanish society with varying intensity for more than twenty years under the banner of *Hispanidad*. The Falange's corporative structures, the military's obsession with national unity, the regime's militant Catholicism could all be wrapped up in archaic liturgies and justified by the notions of *Hispanidad* as somehow linked to a timeless national destiny.[9] Eventually, as a side effect of the renewal and expansion of universities which accompanied the process of economic modernization in Spain, a more empirical

6 Félix G. Olmedo, *El sentido de la guerra de España* (Bilbao, 1938), pp. 18-19.

7 Norman B. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (Beverly Hills, 1975), p. 12; Antonio Marquina Barrio, *La diplomacia Vaticana y la España de Franco 1936-1945* (Madrid, 1983), pp. 159–60.

8 The most malignant statement of this view may be found in F. Martín Torrent, *¿Qué me dice Usted de los presos?* (Barcelona, 1942), *passim*. On the death row conversions, see *ibid.*, pp. 67–79.

9 See Eduardo González Calleja and Fredes Limón Nevado, *La Hispanidad como instrumento de combate: raza e imperio en la prensa franquista durante la guerra civil española* (Madrid, 1988).

and less philosophical approach to the past began to challenge regime historiography, albeit within the confines of the censorship. Nevertheless, even then, most works of history and philosophy either focused on, or existed in the shadow of, the Civil War.[10] The underlying anxiety was redolent of the comparable German obsession with the long-term origins of the Third Reich. However, there was an important difference. Spanish destructiveness was contained within the national boundaries and inflicted on Spaniards themselves, unlike the more widely cast German variant, with the result that the consequent trauma was one of pain rather than of guilt. That is one important reason why it is difficult to imagine the Spanish historical profession being rent asunder by the sort of *Historikerstreit* which has caused such controversy in West Germany.[11]

For the Spaniards, denied liberation in 1945, the question of coming to terms with the past has been rendered difficult by the fact that 'the past' continued for nearly forty years after the war's conclusion and indeed beyond. It was a deliberate policy of the dictatorship that it should be so. One of the earliest and most perceptive of the cultural historians, José Castillejo, had foreseen that when he wrote that 'war, panic, hatred, misery and the recollection of hideous crimes are sure to hamper freedom for a long time'.[12] Fear of a repetition of civil war vied with unrequited desires for a settling of old scores. In the event the general urge after the death of Franco to contribute by whatever means, first to the re-establishment, and then to the consolidation, of democracy had its effect on the historical profession as it did on the population at large. The renunciation of revenge was an unspoken agreement across the entire political spectrum with the exception of the lunatic fringes. This 'pact of oblivion' found its reflection among the historians in a cautious determination to avoid judgements which might suggest grounds for a settling of accounts.[13] The shadows of the Civil War and of the Francoist repression hang over Spain but they do not lour as menacingly as that of the Third Reich does over West Germany. The trend in post-Franco Spain was towards the accumulation of empirical

10 Santos Juliá, 'Segunda República: por otro objeto de investigación', in Manuel Tuñón de Lara *et al.*, *Historiografía española contemporánea* (Madrid, 1980).

11 For expositions of a debate complex in its political implications if not in its empirical content, see Richard J. Evans, 'The new nationalism and the old history: perspectives on the West German *Historikerstreit*', *Journal of Modern History*, vol. 59, no. 4, December 1987; Gordon A. Craig, 'The war of the German historians', *The New York Review of Books*, 15 January 1987; Geoff Eley, 'Nazism, politics and the Image of the Past: Thoughts on the West German *Historikerstreit* 1986–1987', *Past and Present*, no. 121, 1988; Charles S. Maier, *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust and German National Identity* (Cambridge, Mass, 1988); Richard J. Evans, *In Hitler's Shadow: West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi Past* (New York, 1989).

12 José Castillejo, *Wars of Ideas in Spain: Philosophy, Politics and Education* (London, 1937), p. 158.

13 See, for example, a right-wing attempt to play down the scale of the repression, Ramón Salas Larrazabal, *Pérdidas de la guerra* (Barcelona, 1977), pp. 359–95, and a

evidence to the exclusion of all else. The Civil War remained the overriding issue, but there was great reluctance to draw any conclusions which might in some way reopen old wounds. This was reflected in a refusal by the socialist government to sanction any official commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Civil War in 1986.[14]

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine two interlinked and apparently contradictory questions. Why is the Spanish Civil War still an issue that sells books and fills lecture halls? Why did the determination of the dictatorship to keep the Spanish Civil War a living issue fail to prevent the re-establishment of democracy in 1977? Interest in the Spanish Civil War remains undimmed, vividly remembered by participants and eagerly studied by the young in Spain and elsewhere. Yet there is little sense in Spain as there seems to be in Germany of what Ernst Nolte has called 'the past that will not pass away'. The Franco regime used a distorted historical memory as a major weapon in its propaganda armoury. Its purpose was to cow the defeated Republicans and to reward its own supporters, and also to remind them that they must cling to the dictatorship to prevent a resurgence of the left. In fact such policies were only partially successful; they were rejected entirely by the defeated, accepted by some regime supporters but, despite constant streamlining, scorned by the younger generations.[15] After the Caudillo's death, the fruits of such propaganda were to be harvested only in the efforts of nostalgic army officers to reaffirm the nationalist victory in the Civil War by destroying democracy. Despite the regime's politically motivated rewriting of the past, the war was finally relegated to history, at least sufficiently to permit the process of dialogue and consensus by which Spain emerged from its long authoritarian nightmare.

One symptom of the extent to which passions were exhausted despite the regime's efforts is the fact that Spanish historians now eschew cultural and national character interpretations. That is largely a reflex against the

left-wing comment on it which pays tribute to General Salas's honesty and understates the extent to which detailed research has demolished Salas's modest figure, Manuel Tuñón de Lara, Julio Aróstegui, Angel Viñas, Gabriel Cardona and Josep M. Bricall, *La guerra civil española cincuenta años después* (Barcelona, 1985), p. 423. For more critical views, see Josep Fontana, 'Naturaleza y consecuencias del franquismo', in Josep Fontana (ed.), *España bajo el franquismo* (Barcelona, 1986), pp. 22–4, and Alberto Reig Tapia, *Ideología e historia: sobre la represión franquista y la guerra civil* (Madrid, 1984), pp. 25–6.

14 The determination to produce a 'value-free' history of the Civil War as part of the tacit no-revenge pact of the transition period is made explicit in Juan Luis Cebrián, 'Para una nueva cultura política', his introduction to the fiftieth anniversary collection of articles published in the newspaper of which he was editor, *El País, La guerra de España 1936–1939* (Madrid, 1986). The scale of the empiricist tendency may be seen in the fiftieth anniversary history produced by *Historia 16*, Julio Aróstegui *et al.*, *La guerra civil*, 24 vols (Madrid, 1986–8). See also R. A. Stradling, 'The propaganda of the deed: history, Hemingway, and Spain', in *Textual Practice*, vol. 3, no. 1, Spring 1989.

15 Preston, 'War of Words', pp. 3–4.

inanities of regime historiography. In part too, it is a measure of the influence on the profession of Jaime Vicens Vives, the Barcelona scholar who virtually alone carried the banner of modern history inside Spain in the 1950s. Historians now seek to establish the Spanishness of the Spanish Civil War in terms of long-term socio-economic structures rather than of some national propensity to violence. Curiously, what they have not done is to establish the war's Europeanness. It is precisely in its wider dimension that some of the main reasons for the burning interest in the Civil War should be sought. It is true that, until the military uprising of 18 July 1936, the conflicts which were simmering were Spanish ones, for all that they were flavoured by the fashionable contemporary language of fascism and communism. However, the local conflicts were overshadowed once the intervention of Hitler and Mussolini turned what was meant to be a rapid army coup into a long-drawn-out war.

The refusal of Britain and France to intervene to save the legally elected government, the readiness of the Axis powers to fish in troubled waters, and the Byzantine intervention of the Soviet Union did more than convert Spain into the nodal point of Europe. The reactions of the powers also placed Spain in a continuum which dated back to the Bolshevik revolution. Spain became the latest battleground in an ongoing European civil war whose previous battles had been Vienna in 1934, Berlin in 1933, Lisbon in 1926, Rome in 1922. These are not terms in which inward-looking Spanish historians tend to think. Nor are they ones which have exercised the minds of the most influential historians of the origins of the Second World War, the paucity of whose consideration of the Spanish war is lamentable. It is astonishing that the most respected surveys of the origins of the Second World War tend either to ignore the Spanish conflict almost entirely or else to describe it in terms which suggest that its events ran separately from the central drift of international relations. This is to ignore the extent to which the timing of Hitler's central European ventures was calculated on the basis of Nationalist fortunes in Spain and of the reactions of the Western powers to the vagaries of the Francoist cause. The only possible explanation can be the general inclination of historians other than Spaniards and Hispanists to consider Spain a backwater.

In contrast, for politically aware non-Spaniards at the time, the wider implications of what was at stake were altogether clearer. Volunteers left their homes and families to fight in Spain. Many who could not go took part in political demonstrations and participated in 'Aid Spain' campaigns. They did so because they felt that Spain was the battlefield on which a challenge had to be mounted to the growing threat of fascism.[16] Accordingly the subsequent, and largely successful, efforts of the Franco

16 Abe Osheroff and Bill Susman (eds), *¡No Pasaran! The 50th Anniversary of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade* (New York, 1986), p. 3.

regime to keep memories of the Civil War simmering for its own political purposes would also work to its detriment by maintaining international opprobrium. Eventually, the regime's vehement anti-communism would help undermine some of that hostility. Nevertheless, the survival until the 1970s of interest in the Spanish war and of sympathy for the defeated Republic owes much to the association of the Nationalists and their Caudillo with the Axis.

That already clear association was proudly and theatrically trumpeted to the world on 19 May 1939 when 120,000 troops took part in Franco's victory parade through Madrid. The parade was headed by the band of the Carabinieri, a battalion of Italian Black Shirts, and mechanized and cavalry units of the regular Italian army. Thereafter, for five hours, Falangists, Carlist *Requetés* carrying huge crucifixes, regular Spanish troops, foreign legionaries and Moorish mercenaries filed through the streets. The rear was brought up by the Portuguese volunteers who had fought for Franco and, led by General Von Richtofen, Hitler's Condor Legion. Overhead, an aeroplane wrote the name of Franco in smoke.[17] The choreography of close association with the Axis cause was carefully restaged in the summer of 1939. On 1 June a naval convoy took Franco's close collaborator, his Minister of the Interior and brother-in-law, Ramón Serrano Suñer, to Italy along with several generals and 3,000 troops, who paraded through the streets of Rome. Six weeks later an Italian flotilla brought Mussolini's son-in-law and Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano, to Barcelona for a reciprocal visit.[18]

Sympathy for the Axis cause in the Second World War, although never translated into outright belligerence against the Allies, earned Franco the hostility of many Western democrats and not just those of the left. In the last resort Franco did not join Hitler because the Führer could not pay his price. Nevertheless, the Caudillo's passage from neutrality to 'non-belligerence' and then to 'moral belligerence' made it difficult to avoid a postwar association with the defeated cause. During the war refuelling and other facilities in Spain had been made available to the German and Italian navies, intelligence assistance had been freely given and, until mid-1944, invaluable exports of wolfram sent to Germany.[19] It is hardly surprising, in view of Francoist Spain's close involvement in the

17 For a vivid description of the parade see Daniel Sueiro and Bernardo Díaz Nosty, *Historia del franquismo*, 2 vols, 2nd edn (Barcelona, 1985), vol. 1, pp. 22–4. See also Ricardo de la Cierva, *Francisco Franco: un siglo de España*, 2 vols (Madrid, 1973) Vol. II, p. 186.

18 Xavier Tusell and Genoveva García Queipo de Llano, *Franco y Mussolini: la política española durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Barcelona, 1985) pp. 30–40. This book is the best account available of the effusive relations between Franco and Mussolini.

19 The immensely controversial debate over Franco's 'real' intentions in the Second World War has given rise to an enormous literature. The best recent summaries are Tusell and Garcia Queipo de Llano, *Franco y Mussolini*; David Wingeate Pike, 'Franco

Axis cause, that the subsequent survival of interest in the Spanish Civil War should feed off the activities and the ultimate longevity of its victor. The fact that Franco continued for nearly forty years to enjoy a dictatorial power seized with the aid of Hitler and Mussolini and that he had made blatant bids to be part of a victorious Axis world order remained an affront to opponents of fascism until his death in 1975.

For all the regime's propaganda about 'the long years of peace', the Civil War continued to traumatize Spanish life long after the end of formal hostilities. April 1939 did not see the beginnings of peace or reconciliation but rather heralded the institutionalization of full-scale vengeance against the defeated left. For a variety of reasons Franco worked harder than anyone to keep the war a festering issue. In official language, there were only 'victors' and 'vanquished', 'good Spaniards' and 'bad Spaniards', 'patriots' and 'traitors'. The Primate of Spain, Cardinal Gomá, had a pastoral letter censored on 9 August 1939 for using the word 'reconciliation' instead of the officially sanctioned 'recuperation'.[20] The term meant redemption, after due punishment, for those who recanted their liberal heresies and accepted the entire political and moral value system of the victors.

The year 1939, once 'III Triumphal Year' in the Francoist calendar, became enshrined as the 'Year of Victory'. Until the mid-1960s the Falangist hymn, *'Cara al sol'* 'Face to the sun' was regularly heard on public occasions and at close-down every evening on Spanish radio. Every church in Spain had painted or carved on its walls the name of the Falangist leader, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, *el ausente* (the absent one). Spanish public buildings had, and some still have, scrolls of honour for the war dead, but only for those of one side, the *Caídos por Dios y por España* (those who fell for God and for Spain). National holidays in Spain other than saints' feast days were victory festivals: 1 April – 'the Day of Victory', 17 April – 'the Day of the Unification' (to celebrate the forcible unification of all political parties into the Falangist-dominated single party, the *Movimiento*), 18 July 'the Day of the Uprising', 1 October – 'the Day of the Caudillo', 29 October – 'the Day of the Fallen'. It was only in the 1980s that monuments began to sprout up to *'los caídos por la libertad* (those who fell for freedom).

Memories of the war and of the bloody repression which followed it were carefully nurtured in order to keep together the uneasy Francoist

and the Axis stigma', *Journal of Contemporary History*, vol. 17, no. 3, July 1982; Denis Smyth, 'The Moor and the money-lender: politics and profits in Anglo-German relations with Francoist Spain, 1936–1940', in Marie-Luise Recker (ed.), *Von der Konkurrenz zur Rivalität: Das Britische-Deutsche Verhaltnis in den Landern der Europaischen Peripherie 1919–1939*, (Stuttgart, 1986); Charles B. Burdick, *Germany's Military Strategy and Spain in World War II* (Syracuse, 1968); Victor Morales Lezcano, *Historia de la no-beligerancia española durante la segunda guerra mundial* (Las Palmas, 1980). See also Chapter 3, 'Franco and the Axis temptation' in this volume.

20 Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy: The Catholic Church in Spain 1875–1975* (Oxford, 1987), pp. 215–16.

coalition. Gory atrocity literature and purple hymns of praise to Nationalist military exploits were directed at those who belonged to the disparate alliance of regime supporters. It consisted of soldiers and prelates, of landowners, industrialists and bankers, of what might be called the 'service classes' of Francoism, those members of the middle and working classes who, for whatever reasons (opportunism, conviction, or wartime geographical loyalty), threw in their lot with the regime, and finally of ordinary Spanish Catholics who supported the Nationalists as the defenders of religion and law and order.[21] Reminders of the war were useful to rally the wavering loyalty of any or all of these groups. They also, gratifyingly, served to intensify the misery of the defeated whose own deeds of heroism and endurance were distorted into the inhuman acts of the puppets of communism. Within months of the end of hostilities, a massive 'History of the Crusade' was being published in weekly parts, glorifying the heroism of the victors and portraying the vanquished as the dupes of Moscow, as either squalidly self-interested or the blood-crazed perpetrators of sadistic atrocities. Even after the defeat of the Axis, and until well into the 1960s, a stream of publications, many aimed at children, presented the war as a religious crusade against communist barbarism.

This process was continued in school textbooks in various disciplines. Political indoctrination courses under the heading '*Formación del Espíritu Nacional*' were compulsory for all schoolboys. They aimed to imbue the idea of 'true' national character associated with the nationalist victory: aggressive, violent, imperialist. Girls were obliged to take '*Enseñanza del Hogar*', a domestic studies course which purveyed a particularly submissive role for women as the wives and mothers who kept hearth and home ready for virile Falangist warriors. Well into the 1960s, all classrooms had a picture of Franco and a crucifix hanging side by side. At the beginning of the school day the children of the entire school in military formation would raise the Spanish flag, then pray, then sing the Falangist hymn '*Cara al sol*', then file into their single sex classrooms singing one of the anthems of the Falangist Youth Front. The process would be repeated in reverse at the end of the school day, concluding with the lowering of the flag.[22]

21 The notion of 'service classes' is derived from Eduardo Sevilla Guzmán and Salvador Giner, 'Absolutismo despótico y dominación de clase: el caso de España', in *Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico*, (Paris) nos 43–5, enero-junio 1975. The Francoist coalition is best analysed in Amando de Miguel, *Sociología del Franquismo* (Barcelona, 1975).

22 *Formación política: Lecciones para flechas* (Madrid, n. d.); José María Pemán, *La Historia de España contada con sencillez: Para los niños... y para muchos que no lo son* (Cádiz, 1939); Joaquín Arrarás Iribarren, (ed.), *Historia de la Cruzada española*, 36 vols (Madrid, 1939–1943). See also Rafael Valls Montes, *La interpretación de la Historia de España, y sus orígenes ideológicos, en el bachillerato franquista (1938–1953)* (Valencia, 1984) and Fernando Valls, *La enseñanza de la literatura en el franquismo 1936–1951* (Barcelona, 1983); Pamela O'Malley, 'Reservoirs of dignity and pride: schoolteachers and

Those who were more directly implicated in the regime's networks of corruption and repression, the beneficiaries of the killings and the pillage, were especially susceptible to hints that only Franco stood between them and the revenge of their victims. They were to make up what in the 1970s came to be known as the 'bunker', the die-hard Francoists who were prepared to fight for the values of the Civil War from the rubble of the Chancellery.[23] A similar, and more dangerous, commitment came from the praetorian defenders of the legacy of the nationalist uprising and subsequent victory, which Spanish rightists refer to broadly as *el 18 de julio* (from the date of the military rising of 1936). Army officers had been educated since 1939 in academies where they were taught that the military existed to defend Spain from communism, anarchism, socialism, parliamentary democracy, and regionalists who wanted to destroy the nation's unity. Franco used the army not as an instrument of national defence but as a mechanism for guaranteeing the survival of his regime. Promotion, preferment and decorations were used as devices to secure the personal loyalties of potential enemies. Low levels of professionalism hardly mattered in a force whose primordial function was to block political opposition.

The three service academies, the Academia General Militar, revived on 27 September 1940, the Escuela Naval Militar, founded on 15 August 1943 and the Academia General del Aire, founded on 15 September 1945, provided a military education in which ideology prevailed over strategy and technology. A generalized and highly partisan interpretation of Spain's history, and particularly of the years immediately preceding the Civil War took up so much of the curriculum that it virtually squeezed out technical training. The Academia General Militar was concerned, according to its regulations, to educate the cadets 'not only militarily, but also in religious, moral and social terms, channelling and directing all the acts of their lives towards the attainment of becoming perfect Christian Spanish soldiers'. There were virtually no cadets from the regions with historic aspirations to independence, Galicia, the Basque country and Catalonia, and therefore no one to counter the idea that in the regions resided the enemy within. Accordingly, after Franco's death, under an aconfessional Constitution which granted devolution to the regions, and enraged by Basque terrorism, the bunker and its military supporters were to attempt with monotonous frequency to destroy democracy in Spain in the name of the Nationalist victory in the Civil War. They did so in 1978, in 1979, in 1980,

the creation of an educational alternative in Franco's Spain', unpublished PhD thesis (Open University, 1989), pp. 62–3, 261.

23 On the 'bunker', see 'Luis Ramírez' (pseudonym of Luciano Rincón), 'Morir en el bunker', in *Horizonte español 1972*, 3 vols (Paris, 1972), Vol. I, pp. 1–20. See also Chapter 7 'Into the bunker' in this volume.

most notably on 23 February 1981, and again on the eve of the elections of October 1982. For these ultra-rightists, Nationalist propaganda efforts to maintain the hatreds of the Civil War were perhaps gratuitous.[24]

In the long term the propagandistic efforts to make eternal the 'values of 18 July 1936' were in vain. In the developing and increasingly Europeanized and indeed Americanized Spain of the late 1960s the maintenance of an idealized notion of the Civil War as a medieval religious crusade was ever more anachronistic. That point was made starkly when the church changed sides and withdrew its support from the regime. Individual priests had been criticizing the regime since the early 1950s and Catholic workers' associations had long been part of the opposition to the dictatorship. However, after the Second Vatican Council and in response to the encyclicals of Pope John XXIII, even the ecclesiastical hierarchy began a gradual process of dissociating itself from the Franco regime.[25] This became startlingly obvious in September 1971, when a joint assembly of Spanish bishops and priests issued a declaration rejecting the dictatorship's Civil War ideology and begging the forgiveness of the Spanish people for the clergy's failure to be 'true ministers of reconciliation'.[26]

The church was recognizing something to which the regime remained blind. The manipulation of the popular memory of the Civil War was a meaningless exercise for the majority of Spaniards born since 1939. A series of opinion polls held in 1983 in Spain suggested that, far from seeing the Civil War as a glorious crusade to defend true religion against the blood-crazed hordes of Moscow, 73 per cent of Spaniards regarded it as 'a shameful period of Spanish history that was best forgotten'. Only about 20 per cent of Spaniards alive in the mid-1980s were aged thirteen or over in 1936. Leaving out women and those under sixteen, that meant that fewer than 7 per cent of the then Spanish population could have fought in the war. Nevertheless, the impact of the war was still felt. One in four Spaniards has a relative who was killed in the war; one in ten had a relative who was forced into exile in 1939; two out of three had a relative who fought. It was hardly surprising then that nearly 60 per cent regarded the Civil War of 1936–9 as the most formative event in modern Spanish history. There were inevitably high levels of ignorance: 35 per cent of respondents could not say on which side the International Brigades fought; 41 per cent were equally unsure as to the side on which

24 The cultivation of a hermetic military mentality and the consequent emergence of *golpismo* is dealt with in Colectivo Democracia, *Los ejércitos... más allá del golpe* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1981); Julio Busquets, Miguel Angel Aguilar and Ignacio Puche, *El golpe: anatomía y claves del asalto al congreso* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1981). See also Chapter 8, 'Franco's Last Stand', in this volume.

25 Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, pp. 246–50.

26 Cooper, *Catholicism*, pp. 28–41; José Chao Rego, *La Iglesia en el franquismo* (Madrid, 1976), pp. 150–202.

the German Condor Legion fought. On the international aspects of the war, 24 per cent were ignorant of which side was supported by Hitler, 37 per cent of which side was supported by Stalin.[27]

However, the underlying memory of the horrors of the war was such that, although personal hatreds still survived, the post-Franco political consensus was built on a collective agreement to renounce revenge. The hatreds were subsumed into what has been called 'a militant pacifism'. The consequences of that were to be of the greatest importance for the survival of Spain's new democracy. Over 70 per cent of Spaniards described themselves in the late 1970s as belonging to a broad continuum from centre-right to centre-left. In none of the four elections held between 1977 and 1986 did parties of the extreme left or right gain more than 3 per cent of the vote. The Communist Party, at its most moderate and Eurocommunist, never gained more than 10 per cent and in 1982 was fortunate to gain 4 per cent. The corollary was that 40 per cent of Spaniards claimed to have no interest whatsoever in politics, as opposed to 50 per cent in Italy, 28 per cent in Britain, 26 per cent in France and 14 per cent in West Germany.[28] On the other hand, after the abortive military coup of 23 February 1981, millions of Spaniards were sufficiently concerned for the fate of democracy to take to the streets to demonstrate against Colonel Tejero's efforts to repeat the experience of 1936.

That implicit moderation was in large part a reaction against the Francoist attempt to keep alive the hatreds of war and a reflection of a collective horror of what the war meant. Only the most militant Falangist and military supporters of the dictatorship could continue to glory in the 'values of the 18 July' and of the 'Crusade'. The bulk of the population was appalled by what had happened, was determined to avoid its repetition and was repelled by the regime's relentless reiteration of bloody events. At least 300,000 Spaniards were killed during the hostilities: 440,000 went into exile; 10,000 of them were to die in Nazi concentration camps. Another 400,000 in Spain spent time in prison, in concentration camps, or labour battalions. A Law of Political Responsibilities decreed on 9 February 1939 provided blanket justification for the repression. A Special Tribunal for the Repression of Freemasonry and Communism was created on 1 March 1940. Until 1964, when it was replaced by the Tribunal de Orden Público, it carried out the gory selection of victims. Among them were the flower

27 'Encuesta guerra civil', *Cambio 16*, nos 616–19, 19 September-17 October 1983.

28 For detailed analyses of Spanish electoral behaviour, see Juan J. Linz *et al.*, *Informe sociológico sobre el cambio político en España 1975–1981* IV Informe FOESSA Vol. 1 (Madrid, 1981); Howard R. Penniman and Eusebio Mujal Leon (eds), *Spain at the Polls, 1977, 1979 and 1982* (Durham, North Carolina, 1985); Juan J. Linz and José R. Montero (eds), *Crisis y cambio: electores y partidos en la España de los años ochenta* (Madrid, 1986); and Richard Gunther, Giacomo Sani and Goldie Shabad, *Spain after Franco: The Making of a Competitive Party System* (Berkeley, 1986); especially chapters 4 and 8.

of the country's cultural life and the nation's university teaching and research staff virtually in their entirety. Seven thousand schoolteachers were imprisoned. The Republic's journalists were systematically purged, many being executed and almost all losing the opportunity to work.[29]

Until Franco's death Spain was governed as if it were a country occupied by a victorious foreign army. The training, deployment and structure of the Spanish army under Franco was such as to prepare it for action against the native population rather than an external enemy. That was entirely in keeping with the Caudillo's view, expressed in 1937, that he had been fighting a 'frontier war'. From 1937, collective trials lasting a matter of minutes had been held with only the most cursory observance of legal procedure. Thereafter, folders of death sentences were taken to Franco by the Juridical Assessor to the Army, Colonel Lorenzo Martínez Fuset. Contrary to the regime myth of a tireless and merciful Caudillo agonizing late into the night over death sentences, the reality was harsh. In fact, after lunch, over coffee, the Caudillo would sign sheafs of them, often without reading the details but nonetheless specifying the most savage form of execution, strangulation by *garrote*. Occasionally, he would compound the pain and humiliation of the victims' families by writing *garrote y prensa* (garrote with press coverage).[30]

Killing had gone on for some years after the war. In addition to the routine of executions there were occasional orchestrated rituals of revenge. In November 1940, for ten days and ten nights, a massively choreographed torch-lit procession escorted the mortal remains of the Falangist leader José Antonio Primo de Rivera from Alicante to the Escorial, the resting place of the kings and queens of Spain. It was the most spectacular of many deliberate attempts to link Francoism and Falangism to the historical glories of Philip II. Every section of the Falange was involved: youth, women, syndicates, and also regular troops. Along the route the procession was greeted by huge bonfires and church services. Falangists from every province took their turns as pall-bearers. As they were relieved, artillery salutes and bell-ringing broke out in all the towns and villages of Spain. All school classes and university lectures were interrupted for teachers and professors to raise their arms in the

29 On the repression and the exile, see Reig Tapia, *Ideología e historia*; Josep M. Solé i Sabaté, *La repressió franquista a Catalunya* (Barcelona, 1985); *Catalunya sota el règim franquista: informe sobre la persecució de la llengua i la cultura de Catalunya pel règim del general Franco* (Paris, 1973); Antonio Vilanova, *Los olvidados: los exiliados españoles en la segunda guerra mundial* (Paris, 1969); Vicente Fillol, *Los perdedores* (Caracas, 1971); Avel·lí Artís-Gener, *La diáspora republicana* (Barcelona, 1975).

30 Ramón Garriga, *Los validos de Franco* (Barcelona, 1981) pp. 42–3, 72–3; Ramón Serrano Suñer, *Entre el silencio y la propaganda, la historia como fue: memorias* (Barcelona, 1977) pp. 243–4; Fernando González, *Liturgias para un Caudillo* (Madrid, 1977) p. 75; Philippe Nourry, *Francisco Franco: la conquête du Pouvoir* (Paris, 1975) p. 541; interview of the author with Ramón Serrano Suñer in Madrid in 1977.

fascist salute and shout 'José Antonio ¡Presente!'. When the cortège arrived in Madrid, it was received by the high commands of the armed services and representatives from Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. At the Escorial Palace of San Lorenzo there were monumental wreaths from both Hitler and Mussolini. Prisons had been attacked along the way and Republican prisoners assaulted and in at least one case, murdered.[31]

The last official victim of Francoist revenge against the Republican side was the Communist Julián Grimau, executed on 20 April 1963 for crimes allegedly committed during the Civil War. His trial and execution was widely perceived as a deliberate gesture by the regime to revive memories of the war. There were major demonstrations outside Spanish embassies in London, Rome, Moscow, Copenhagen and Paris. In Brussels the embassy was stoned and the one in Mexico City sacked by a mob. The regime press quickly blamed world communism and drew comparisons with the devastation of the Civil War, equally presented as communist-inspired.[32] Grimau was not, however, to be the last political prisoner put to death by the dictatorship. The anarchists Francisco Granados Gata and Joaquín Delgado Martínez were executed by *garrote vil* on 17 August 1963. The anarchist Salvador Puig Antich was executed, also by *garrote vil*, on 2 March 1974. Two militants of the Basque revolutionary separatist organization ETA and three of the Marxist-Leninist faction Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriota were shot by firing squads on 27 September 1975.

For the captured Republicans who escaped the executioner there remained the appalling conditions of massively overcrowded prisons. Sentences were expected to be 'redeemed by work'. In the 1940s captive Republicans were formed into 'penal detachments' and 'labour battalions' to be used as forced labour in the construction of dams, bridges, and irrigation canals. Many were hired out to private firms for work in construction and mining. Twenty thousand were employed, and several were killed or badly injured, in the construction of the Valle de los Caídos, a gigantic mausoleum for Franco and a monument to those who fell in his cause.[33] The Valle de los Caídos was merely one of several

31 Ian Gibson, *En busca de José Antonio* (Barcelona, 1980) pp. 246–8; Sueiro and Díaz Nosty, *Franquismo*, I, pp. 176–82.

32 On the deliberate nature of the efforts to maintain memories of the war, see the article by Dionisio Ridruejo in *Le Monde*, 24 April 1963 and Salvo Mazzolini, 'La guerra civile non è ancora finita', *L'Espresso* (Rome) 28 April 1963. On the destruction of the Spanish embassy in Mexico City, see *Excelsior* (México D. F.) 21 April 1963. For the regime's exploitation of the attacks on embassies, see *Diario de Barcelona*, 19 April 1963; *La Vanguardia Española* (Barcelona) 21 April 1963. For a general survey, see Amandino Rodríguez Armada and José Antonio Novais, *¿Quién mató a Julián Grimau?* (Madrid: Ediciones 99, 1976), *passim*.

33 Martín Torrent, *Los presos*, pp. 109–115; Daniel Sueiro, *El Valle de los Caídos: los secretos de la cripta franquista* (Barcelona: Editorial Argos Vergara, 1983), *passim* and especially pp. 61–7 and 195–205.

efforts to perpetuate the memory of the Francoist victory in permanent form. The war-ravaged wreckage of the town of Belchite was left standing as a Nationalist monument. The ruined Alcázar of Toledo was rebuilt as a symbol of the Nationalist heroism displayed during its three-month siege. In Madrid the entrance to the University City, the site of the savage battle for the capital, was marked by a gigantic Arch of Victory. The Valle de los Caídos, however, dwarfed them all.

The monument was Franco's brainchild, conceived as the Pharoahs had conceived the pyramids, revealing both his own messianism and his determination to intimidate the population with his memorial of the war. The decree announcing its foundation on 1 April 1940 declared that

> the dimension of our Crusade, the heroic sacrifices which victory involved and the transcendental importance which this epic had for the future of Spain cannot be perpetuated with the simple monuments with which the outstanding events of our history and the glorious deeds of her sons are usually commemorated in towns and villages. It is necessary that the stones which rise up should have the grandeur of ancient monuments, that they challenge time and forgetfulness and constitute a place for meditation and rest where future generations will pay tribute to those who bequeathed them a better Spain.

When finally complete, the Valle de los Caídos was to be Franco's pride and joy. His hope was that it would establish a Francoist imperial architecture which would eternally link his regime and his victory with the triumphs of Charles V and Philip II.

The Caudillo, having personally searched for and found a site in 1940, expected the monument to be completed within a year of the first announcement. In fact, it took nearly twenty years to dig the 262-metre-long basilica, to construct the monastery – carved into the hillside of the Valle de Cuelgamuros in the Sierra de Guadarrama to the north-east of Madrid – and to erect the immense cross which towered 150 meters above it. The arms of the cross were as wide as a two-lane highway. The entire enterprise cost Spain almost as much as had Philip II's Escorial in a more prosperous era. The original notion was that it would be the final resting place for those who died fighting on the Nationalist side or as victims of 'red terror' in the Republican zone. By 1958 the regime had evolved sufficiently for the vaults, in theory at least, to be open to those who fought on either side, provided they were Spaniards and Catholics. The latter condition excluded many Republicans. In any case, considerable, other, obstacles were placed in the way of the burial of Republicans.[34]

34 Sueiro, *El Valle de los Caídos*, pp. 8–12, 118–43, 184–92.

The architectural style of the Valle de los Caídos emphasized the extent to which Franco, like most activists of the Spanish right, was obsessed with Spain's fall from imperial greatness. They saw the Civil War as the first step back to past glories achieved before Spain was corrupted by the ideas of Erasmus, Voltaire and Montesquieu. Franco rarely missed an opportunity to eliminate the legacy of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution and other symbols of progress. The flowering of liberal values in Spain was for the Caudillo merely the visible sign of what he called 'the great invasion of evil'. Spanish history since Philip II consisted only of three 'calamitous centuries' that brought decadence, corruption and freemasonry. His eternal delays in restoring the monarchy were excused on the grounds that the Bourbon dynasty was no longer capable of emulating the virile 'totalitarian' monarchy which had expelled the Jews and the Moriscos and conquered America. Present-day monarchists were hampered by liberal prejudices inherited from the nineteenth century, a period which Franco fervently desired 'to wipe from our history'.[35] Leaping over the three awkward centuries of decadence meant creating a political model by fusing medieval despotism and Axis totalitarianism. Accordingly, when his acolytes referred to Fernando el Católico as the first authentic Caudillo, they were implying that Franco was part of a line of great leaders that had been interrupted after Philip II.[36]

The reality of what this meant in terms of wiping out the visible signs of modernity was seen throughout the 1940s. In the context of the material damage caused during the Civil War, an economic system born of a bizarre fusion of medieval ideas with fascist autarky guaranteed stagnation and hardship. The war had destroyed 60 per cent of Spain's railway rolling stock. The proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture reverted to the levels of the turn of the century. National income was overall at the levels of 1914 but, given population increases, the per capita figures corresponded to the late nineteenth century. Real wages were barely at 50 per cent of 1936 levels a decade after the war had finished. There was rationing until 1952 and the rations alone were insufficient to maintain human existence. There sprang up a huge and all-embracing black market system, the *estraperlo*, wherein anything could be obtained. Food prices were about ten times the officially sanctioned figures. The consequences were widening gaps in living standards. Dyptheria, typhoid

35 See speeches by Franco on 14 May 1946, 19 October 1946, 28 March 1950, 13 June 1958, 2 October 1961, 1 April 1964 quoted in Agustín del Río Cisneros (ed.), *Pensamiento político de Franco*, 2 vols (Madrid: Ediciones del Movimiento, 1975), Vol. I, pp. 78–93. Franco's view of history is expounded in a letter of 12 May 1942 to the pretender to the throne, Don Juan de Borbón, reprinted in Alfredo Kindelán, *La verdad de mis relaciones con Franco* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1981), pp. 42–6.

36 Valls, *La enseñanza*, p. 67. See also C. H. Cobb, 'Recuperación': An Aspect of the Cultural Policy of the Franco Regime', *Iberian Studies*, vol. VIII, Autumn 1979.

and tuberculosis were rampant. Infant mortality increased. In 1942, in the Andalusian province of Jaén, it was 347 per 1,000. There was a massive increase in prostitution. In 1950, milk delivered to Madrid was watered down by 50 per cent. Prewar per capita consumption of meat was not reached until 1971.[37]

Just as wages were being effectively slashed, strikes were treated as sabotage and made punishable by long prison sentences. The trade unions were destroyed, their funds, their printing presses and other property seized by the state and the Falange. Travel and the search for jobs were controlled by a system of safe conducts and certificates of political and religious reliability. This effectively made second-class citizens of those defeated Republicans who escaped imprisonment. The Franco regime was especially committed to the maintenance of the rural social structure which had been threatened by the Republic. Rural labourers were forced to work the soil under conditions even more inhuman than those they had known before 1931. With no social welfare safety net, not to work was to starve. The Civil Guard and armed retainers employed by the big landowners, the *latifundistas*, maintained a brutal vigilance of the estates against the pilfering of hungry peasants.

The repressive labour relations of the 1940s and 1950s contributed to higher profits and the accumulation of native capital. It was also a contribution, along with Franco's much-vaunted anti-communism, to the process of making Spain attractive to foreign investors. Foreign capital flooded in. The boom years of European capitalism saw tourists pouring south as Spanish migrant labourers headed north, from where they would send back their foreign currency earnings. Gradually, within the antiquated political strait-jacket of Francoist Spain, there began to grow a new, dynamic, modern society. The pro-fascist 'New State' of the 1940s gave way to the authoritarian despotism of the 1950s, but that too was to find itself overtaken by circumstances.[38] Surrounded by sycophantic courtiers as obsessed as he was with the perpetuation of the victory of 1939, the increasingly senile Franco withdrew ever more into his El Pardo palace.[39] By the time of the energy crisis of the 1970s many Francoists were beginning to wonder if their own survival did not lie in some sort of accomodation with the forces of the democratic opposition.

The more progressive of his supporters were shocked into accepting the need to come to terms with the present by the executions of political prisoners authorized by Franco in March 1974 and September 1975.

37 Sueiro and Díaz Nosty, *El franquismo*, I, p. 134; Rafael Abella, *La vida cotidiana en España bajo el régimen de Franco* (Barcelona, 1985), pp. 49–56.

38 This idea is developed more fully in Paul Preston, *The Triumph of Democracy in Spain* (London, 1986) chapter 1.

39 For a gruesome account of the atmosphere therein, see Vicente Gil, *Cuarenta años junto a Franco* (Barcelona, 1981), p. 139 ff.

Franco's blood-lust, in the face of international opprobrium, provoked fear and distaste among the waverers. By 1977, only two years after his death, Franco's worst nightmares had begun to be realized. King Juan Carlos appointed as prime minister an apparatchik of the Francoist single party, the *Movimiento*, Adolfo Suárez. His job was to exploit the intricacies of the Francoist pseudo-constitution to permit a bloodless transition to democracy.[40] The operation to bring together the progressive elements of the regime and the moderate majority of the democratic operation was to be backed by an overwhelming consensus of right and left. Franco's legacy was the memory of the Civil War and the spirit of revenge. It was rejected by the vast majority of Spaniards and most crucially by Franco's heir, Juan Carlos, who became a national symbol of reconciliation. On 23 February 1981, against the wilful minority of nostalgic conspirators, the king was to risk his throne and his personal safety in the cause of a democracy for all Spaniards.[41] The cherished Francoist divisions between victors and vanquished, Spain and anti-Spain, were finally exposed as meaningless.

40 This process is analysed fully in Preston, *Triumph*, *passim*.

41 There is already a huge bibliography on the 1981 coup. The most comprehensive surveys are Colectivo Democracia, *op. cit.*; José Oneto, *La verdad sobre el caso Tejero* (Barcelona, 1982); Pilar Urbano, *Con la venia... yo indagué el 23F* (Barcelona, 1982).